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vABSTRACT 
 
Constitutional War Powers of the United States: The Founding Prescription and 
Historical Adherence
(Written by Blake Michael Annexstad under the direction of Dr. Miles Armaly) 
  
When crafting the United States Constitution, America’s Founders carefully prescribed 
the institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers between the legislative and 
executive branches of the federal government. To examine how America’s leadership 
has adhered to the Founder’s intentions, this study carefully studies United States 
history from the colonial era to the present day. Throughout this study, it is clear that 
there has been enormous deviance from the intentions of the Founders concerning the 
institutional balance and exercise of war powers between the legislative and executive 
branches. While American leadership adhered to the constitutional prescription for 
nearly 160 years following ratification, beginning in 1942, the Nation’s powers of war 
began to expropriate from Congress in favor of the presidency. Throughout the Cold 
War, American presidents typically ignored the traditional role of Congress in 
authorizing hostilities, by unilaterally ordering military action across the globe. In doing 
so, presidents typically the right to do so under an expansive interpretation of the 
president’s Article II authorities or under the auspice of supposed authority from United 
Nations (U.N.) resolutions or support from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
allies. While the presidency’s powers over war have gradually increased for nearly 
eighty years through expansive assertions of power, Congress has largely enabled such 
expropriation of its powers through a lack of meaningful opposition to the practice. 
While the War Powers Resolution (1973) serves as the most meaningful example of 
congressional opposition to presidential assertions of unilateral authority, each president 
since its passage have ignored the resolution as an unconstitutional encroachment on 
their war powers authority. Additionally, as the nature of technology and warfare has 
changed throughout the post-1942 era, presidents have more easily been enabled to 
order U.S. military action across the globe. This is particularly evident following the 
September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States, where presidents have been 
aided by advancements in technology, which have enabled them to retain America’s 
global hegemonic role through increased U.S. military action, under broad and outdated 
congressional authorizations, supposed U.N. authority or in support of NATO allies.
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§  Section 
  In the early hours of January 3rd, 2020, a United States military drone strike 
targeted and killed Iranian major general Qassem Soleimani at the direction of President 
Donald J. Trump near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq (Helsel et al.). In a following 
statement, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the death of the infamous Iranian 
leader, stating that the President had “taken decisive action to protect U.S. personnel 
abroad” from an imminent threat and to deter future Iranian attack plans (Helsel et al.). 
Hours later, the President himself echoed the defensive rational for the order, claiming 
“We took action last night to stop a war. We did not take action to start a war.” (White 
House).  
 In Washington D.C., Republican and Democratic congressional leaders were 
unified in labeling Soleimani as an enemy of the United States and a terrorist whose 
death should not be mourned by any American (Santucci). While united in calling 
Soleimani an enemy of the United States, many Democrats and some Republicans in 
Congress criticized the President for acting unilaterally without the prior congressional 
authorization (Carney). Days later, on January 7th, Iran retaliated against the U.S. for the 
killing of its prized commander by launching more than a dozen ballistic missiles from 
Iran at an Iraqi airbase housing U.S. forces and materiel (Macias). Following Iran’s 
retaliation, the House of Representatives issued a sharp rebuke of Trump’s use of the 
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Introduction 
military by approving a measure directing the President “to terminate the use of United 
States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran or any part of its 
government or military” unless “Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory 
authorization for such use of the Armed Forces” (Segers and Congress H.Con.Res.83). 
Being a concurrent resolution, the legislation only requires the approval of both chambers 
of Congress and not that of the President to enter into affect. If the concurrent resolution 
were to pass, some legal scholars believe such a resolution would not even have a legal 
affect on the President’s powers over the military.  
 As United States-Iran relations continue to remain in a state of flux, the situation 
in Congress illustrates an interesting constitutional question which has been the subject of 
debate since the inception of the American experiment: When authoring the Constitution, 
what did the Founding Fathers intend the legislative and executive branches to do in the 
context of war, and how have these branches adhered to the Founders’ original intent 
concerning war powers throughout American history?  
 Through this study, it is evident that the Founders crafted an evident institutional 
balance of the Nation’s war powers between the legislative and executive branches of the 
federal government in the Constitution. According to the Founders’ intentions, the 
legislature was to control the initiation of hostilities through statutory authorization, while 
the executive branch was limited to operational control of the Nation’s military forces in 
pursuit of such authorizations—except cases of foreign attack against the United States 
which necessitated swift and decisive action from the president. From ratification until 
1942, American leadership—Congress and the president— largely adhered to the 
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institutional intent of the Founders regarding war powers. During this era, presidents 
most always only ordered military action in pursuance of prior congressional 
authorizations or in defense following foreign aggressions and attacks against the United 
States. Beginning in 1942, this institutional balance prescribed by the Founders was 
largely ignored by American leadership as the United States shifted from isolation to 
neutrality. In modern practice post-1942, presidents often ignored the role of Congress in 
authorizing the use of military force and unilaterally thrust American forces into action 
abroad. While presidents have asserted expanded authority in the realms of war, Congress 
has largely appeased the expropriation of its powers through a lack of meaningful legal or 
political opposition to the practice. As such, modern presidents have wielded seemingly 
unopposed authority in ordering military action, in spite of the Founders’ intentions and 
the Constitution itself. 
  
3
 In order to answer how Congress and Presidents have adhered to the intentions of 
the Founders throughout the history of the American experiment, this first chapter will 
provide the framework necessary to examine the history of the war powers post-
ratification in the following chapters. As such, this chapter is divided into several sections 
that collectively tell the story of the Founders’ intentions. The first section will detail the 
various clauses and provisions within the Constitution itself. As with many constitutional 
ambiguities, it is necessary to include many different clauses, not just those which are 
readily apparent to the war powers debate but may have been used in the debate over 
American war powers throughout American history (A. The Constitution). 
 Following an examination of the Constitution, the second section of this chapter 
will then examine the circumstances and experiences of the British experience, noting 
what conceptions of war the Founders cultivated from life with the king and parliament. 
With this in mind, the section will also investigate the ideas of several prominent political 
philosophers of the time: Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Locke, whose writings heavily 
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Chapter I: The Founding Prescription 
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.  
       —James Madison (1788.)
influenced the Founders’ ideals when eventually structuring the American Constitution 
(B. The British Experience and the Philosophical Roots of the Constitution). 
 The third section of this chapter will then examine the dawn of the American 
experiment, by investigating the experiences of the individual states under their 
respective state constitutions following independence. Additionally, this section will also 
examine the pitfalls of the original central government of the United States, which existed 
under the Articles of Confederation (C. The Experience of Individual States and the 
Central Government under the Articles of Confederation). 
 Following an examination of the various circumstances under the Articles of 
Confederation, the fourth section of this chapter will review the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, as the Founders met in Philadelphia to craft the Constitution itself. 
While exact transcripts of the various debates regarding war powers and executive 
authority are scarce, several members of the convention took extensive notes of many of 
the proceedings. Through these notes, we are offered an additional lens into the Founders’ 
original intent when crafting the Nation’s distribution of war powers (D. The 
Constitutional Convention of 1787) 
 Following an examination into the Constitution itself, the ideas and norms of the 
philosophical and legal British traditions, the experience of the states and central 
government under the Articles of Confederation, and the notes of the Constitutional 
Convention, the fifth section examines the Federalist Papers. An examination into the 
Federalist Papers affords a glimpse into the minds and rationale of three of the most 
influential Constitutional framers and Founders— Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and 
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James Madison— when seeking to ratify the Constitution’s alternative government to that 
of the Articles of Confederation (E. The Federalist Papers). 
A. The Constitution 
 The Constitution categorically grants both the legislative and executive branches 
powers associated with the use of the military and war-making. Aside from establishing 
the legislative branch, Article I of the Constitution provides the scope of Congress’s 
constitutional powers concerning the use and control over the military. Central to the 
debate regarding legislative authority are the provisions found within Section 8 of this 
Article, which lists the enumerated powers of the legislature. Clause 11 of Section 8, 
appropriately referred to as the War Powers Clause, grants Congress the power to 
“declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 11). While the War Powers Clause lays the 
foundation of legislative authority in the realm of the military and military actions, 
Section 8 also introduces a plethora of additional clauses that have been used to reinforce 
legislative authority, including:  
• “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 10) 
• “To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for 
a longer Term than two Years.”  (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 12) 
• “To provide and maintain a Navy.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 13) 
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• “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 14) 
• “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 15) 
• “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” (Article 1, § 
8, Clause 16) 
• Necessary and Proper Clause: “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 18) 
Though not necessarily as apparent to the overall debate, the Constitution also explicitly 
prohibits the states from engaging in war without the consent of Congress: 
• Compact Clause: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless 
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” (Article 1,§ 
10, Clause 3) 
Across the constitutional framework provided for the federal government, Article II 
establishes the executive branch and intricacies pertaining to presidential powers over the 
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military. As Article I does with the legislature, the enumerated powers granted to the 
president over the military are not limited to a single clause. Instead, the executive’s war 
powers are fundamentally sourced from three constitutional provisions: 
• The Vesting Clause: ”The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.” (Article 2,§ 1, Clause 1) 
• The Commander in Chief Clause: “President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States….” (Article 2,§ 2, Clause 1) 
• The Take Care Clause: The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed….” (Article 2,§ 3, Clause 5) 
Also within Section 2, the Constitution enumerates the president’s power to make treaties 
and appointments, by and with the consent of the Senate.  
 While the focus of this essay is to examine the distribution and scope of war 
powers between the legislative and executive branch, it would not be an appropriate 
assessment without also examining the judicial branch’s role within the debate. Within 
Article III, the Constitution outlines the scope of judicial power, by extending such power 
to “all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority….” (Article III,§ 
2, Clause 1). Under the authority granted within this aforementioned Clause, the judicial 
branch has jurisdiction over the federal law of the United States, which includes dealing 
with any legal issues which may arise in times of military conflict (Lawfare). Examples 
of instances in which the courts have dealt with matters pertaining to war and military 
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conflict are plentiful throughout the history of the American experiment, and shall be 
highlighted within the following chapters of this assessment. 
B. The British Experience and the Philosophical Roots of the Constitution 
 While the Founding Fathers would eventually reject British control, they would 
not reject many of its legal traditions. Before the Revolutionary War and independence 
from the British Empire, there was no such thing as an American identity. To this point, 
the Founders still identified as British through their ancestral lineage, and thus held fast 
to many of their customs and traditions. Many of the Founders were lawyers themselves, 
educated in the practice of British common law and the British Constitution (Sevi 77). 
During this period, it was not uncommon for a government to have a constitution not 
codified within a single physical document as we think of with the U.S. Constitution. 
Rather, the British Constitution was—and still is today— an unwritten constitution, built 
upon a “host of diverse laws, practices and conventions that have evolved over a long 
period of time” (Blackburn). 
 While the British Constitution may be an abstract sense of the modern 
interpretation of the phrase, codified documents within it such as the Magna Carta (1215) 
and the Bill of Rights (1689), detail political ideals and pitfalls which would eventually 
shape much of the Founders’ desire for good government. The Magna Carta established 
the Parliament of England, which would later become the Parliament of Great Britain in 
1707, which ruled over the American colonies (Blackburn). Following the establishment 
of the Parliament of England through the Magna Carta, the power of the British monarch 
9
would forever be in a state of gradual decline, as the legislature usurped many of the 
Crown’s traditionally-held powers. Among these traditionally-held contested powers 
were control over the British military forces and the power to conduct foreign affairs 
(Blackburn). Traditionally, the British monarch held broad powers over foreign affairs, 
including he power to unilaterally initiate hostilities (Blackburn). 
 Following the Glorious Revolution in 1689, the passage of the British Bill of 
Rights finally tipped the balance of power towards the legislature (Blackburn) by limiting 
the power of the monarch, securing parliamentary freedom of speech and parliamentary 
elections, and establishing concrete rights of Parliament (Blackburn). By the eighteenth 
century, any of the king’s long-term policy prerogatives which involved the use of the 
military relied on parliamentary support for approval. In order to secure funding for the 
use of the military, the king and his ministers would need to make their case before 
Parliament, and thus be subjected to their scrutiny and debate. Even if the Parliament 
sought to eliminate funding however, the British monarch could still initiate hostilities 
and draw the people into war (Blackburn).  
 Aside from demonstrating a long power struggle between the British legislature 
and the executive, the British Constitution also promotes includes a myriad of phrases 
which would later be found within the American Constitution (Legal Information 
Institute). For instance, “Commander in Chief,” “declare war,” “granting Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal,” “raise and support Armies,” and “executive Power” all can be 
traced to their roots within the British Constitution (Blackburn). These phrases, coupled 
together with the historical pretext of British power struggles between the legislature and 
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the executive would be familiar to well-educated American colonists. Thus the Founders, 
many of whom being well-versed in British legal tradition and law, would begin their 
understanding of executive power and right as it is introduced through the British 
Constitution.  
 While the Founders certainly understood executive powers as they were used 
throughout the British experience, it is important to note that the Founders sought to 
attain political knowledge and thought elsewhere. Rather than be singularly influenced by 
the British history, well-educated American colonists in the eighteenth century were 
heavily influenced by the political thought of Blackstone, Locke and Montesquieu. These 
three philosophers wrote extensively their own understandings of good government, 
particularly focusing on the balance of power between the branches and the intricacies of 
executive power.  
 William Blackstone was one of England’s leading law scholars and politicians of 
the eighteenth century, most famous for his Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(William and Mary). He argued that the king had a royal “prerogative” which allowed 
him to unilaterally make treaties or appointments. Blackstone wrote that this power also 
extended to declaring war, raising armies and navies, and to issuing letters of marque and 
reprisal (Sevi 78). Blackstone believed the king was to be properly considered 
“generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the kingdom,” so that the king 
would have the “sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies” (Blackstone). 
Realistically however, the days of English generalissimo kings were long gone by the 
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eighteenth century. As mentioned prior, the king could not freely wield the military 
without the support of Parliament through their power over appropriations. 
 It is important to note that Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
were used extensively by St. George Tucker, one of the most cited legal scholars in the 
early United States (William and Mary). While Blackstone succeeded in discussing 
various areas of common law, it failed to properly address the attitudes of American 
society or to properly address the new American government (William and Mary). Tucker 
believed Blackstone to be too sympathetic towards the Crown versus that of the 
legislature to accepted by Americans. In order to make Blackstone’s words more 
palatable for early Americans, Tucker used Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England as a baseline for his own work, Blackstone’s Commentaries, which he began to 
write as a more suitable alternative to the American reader in 1795 (William and Mary). 
In 1803, Tucker published his work, now organized into five volumes, to better serve the 
people of the young American nation through a better understanding of its legal system 
and government. Until 1827, Tucker’s Commentaries served as the most-cited major 
treatise on American law in the United States (William and Mary). Lawyers and judges 
would frequently use Tucker’s works as a basis for their own understanding of American 
law, with the Supreme Court referencing it in forty early-American cases (William and 
Mary). Even today, Tucker’s Commentaries continue to be referred to by modern 
lawyers, legal scholars, and judges as a basis of early American interpretation of British 
and American law (William and Mary). 
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 Aside from Blackstone, John Locke was very influential in shaping the Founders’ 
understandings of the intricacies of government. For instance, Thomas Jefferson 
borrowed several of his most famous philosophical thoughts from Locke when 
composing the Declaration of Independence, which he modeled after the English 
Declaration of Rights, as written following England’s Glorious Revolution 
(Constitutional Rights Foundation). Locke’s influence is apparent through many of the 
notion within the Declaration of Independence, such as through the incorporation of 
“Life, Liberty, and pursuit of happiness,” an idea first contemplated by Locke in his Two 
Treatises of Government, penned during the Glorious Revolution of 1689 (Constitutional 
Rights Foundation).  
 Just as Blackstone, Locke believed that it was necessary to have a strong 
executive prerogative, which he considered federative power (Tuckness). Locke’s 
prerogative sought to enable the executive with the ability to freely wield the military 
unilaterally to protect the interests of the nation. He believed that while the laws enabled 
the executive to carry out the laws where it was clear and easily understood, chiefly 
within internal affairs, the executive must have the power to maintain public good outside 
of the confines of the law (Tuckness). Locke emphasized this point in his Two Treatises, 
where he wrote:  
Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those 
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in 
his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require 
…it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the 
executive power… (Locke, Two Treatises, § 159) 
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According to Locke, executive prerogative gave the executive the necessary power to act 
in accordance with an executive’s own discretion, even if that action violated the law, in 
order to more faithfully fulfill the laws which seek the preservation of the public life and 
liberty (Tuckness).  
 While Locke advocated for a strong executive, he championed the idea of that 
separation of powers was necessary to a legitimately functioning government which 
operates according to the public good. Based off of his own experiences under British 
rule, Locke believed that a strong legislative authority, representative of the people, was 
necessary to counteract the selfish ambitions which may arise through a strong executive 
prerogative, such as instances of unjust taxation or other attempts at impeding liberty 
(Tuckness). While this legislative counterbalance was necessary in the eyes of Locke, he 
believed the legislature was “usually too numerous, and too slow” in their decision 
making to best protect the public good, versus the independent authority awarded through 
a strong executive prerogative (Locke, Two Treatises, § 160). 
 Much like Locke’s conceptual “federative power,” Montesquieu also advocated 
for a strong executive prerogative through his version, which he called “executive power” 
(Tuckness). Like Locke, Montesquieu believed that the executive needed the power to act 
outside of the law, when the law falls short of protecting the public good. Montesquieu 
builds on Locke’s conception, by expanding his prerogative to encompass greater 
authority in war making and foreign affairs, as he believed the establishment of public 
security was not limited to an internal connotation (Tuckness). In defining the executive, 
Montesquieu wrote “by the executive power, the prince or magistrate makes peace or 
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war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against 
invasions” (Fordham). While Montesquieu believed the executive power should extend to 
foreign affairs and war powers, he also believed that when too much power was held in 
the hands of a single person, “there can be no liberty” (Fordham). As such, he conceived 
a system of checks and balances built on the separation of powers between the branches 
which would later become the foundation of the U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Rights 
Foundation). Montesquieu argued that while the executive would have considerable 
powers in foreign affairs and war, the legislatures would be able to check such powers 
through their control over appropriations. Montesquieu praised the British Parliament’s 
ability to appropriate annual military funding, which allowed the Parliament to dissolve 
the military, if necessary, to sustain liberty (Fordham). Once permitted by the legislative 
body however, Montesquieu argued that the executive should have complete control over 
the army, stating:  
…once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the 
legislative, but on the executive power, and this from the very nature of the thing; 
its business consisting more in action than in deliberation. (Fordham) 
 While the Founders certainly understood executive powers as they were used 
throughout the British experience, it is important to note that the Founders sought to 
eliminate the tyrannical tendencies of the monarch, such as those exhibited during King 
George III’s reign over the American colonies. With an understanding of these tendencies 
through their hereditary ties to the Britain, the Founders would eventually draw on the 
commentaries of Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu to create a far more balanced 
national government, complete with a strong executive.  
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C. The Experience of Individual States and the Federal Government under the Articles of 
Confederation 
 Besides the knowledge gained through their British roots, the experiences of the 
states under their individual constitutions and the Articles of Confederation proved 
significant to the Founders’ understanding of good governance. This notion is reinforced 
by historian Willi Paul Adams, who wrote: 
The state constitutions’ profound influence on the drafting of the federal 
Constitution and the ratification debates . . . took various shapes and forms, 
ranging from explicit institutional precedent and reasoning by structural analogy 
to negative examples of what to avoid . . . . [T]he state constitutions were a 
natural point of reference in the constitutional debates of 1787–88 because they 
were the constitutions Americans knew best. (Adams 290) 
 Following independence from the British Empire, the American states were ripe 
with anti-monarchical sentiment. Just as the Founders, the first state constitutions were 
direct descendants from the British colonial system which preceded them, being 
“modified to the extent necessary to bring them into harmony with the republican spirit of 
the people” (Morey 19). Every state, whether through a preamble or a declaration of 
rights to their constitution, prefaced in general terms that the democratic principles of 
good government were partly learned through their experience and reason under previous 
governments and rule (Morey 19). As demonstrated through the tensions between the 
legislatures and executives in the states during this post-independence period, the 
implementation of a weak executives proved unworkable. When crafting the 
Constitution, the Founders used the experiences of the individual states to implement a 
strong executive. As a necessary counterbalance to the implementation of a strong 
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executive, the Founders would institute a system of checks to offset such authority. In the 
context of war powers, an executive hampered by numerous legislative checks is 
inconsistent with future claims of unilateral presidential assertions over the Nation’s war 
powers.  
 Just having fought a brutal war against what they considered a tyrannical 
executive in King George III, the framers of the individual state constitutions sought to 
endow the legislative branch with a vast majority of the power. From 1776 to 1787, seven 
of the eight newly adopted state constitutions “included almost every conceivable 
provision for reducing the executive to a position of complete subordination” (Sevi 80,  
Chandler 441). Among these provisions, the executive would be subject to the destruction 
of the executive prerogative in favor of an legislative executive council, entrusting the 
legislature to elect the executive and control the state’s military forces state, and 
extensive term limits (Morey 28). For example, after being elected by the legislature, 
Virginia’s governor would only be able to exercise executive power with the advice of the 
state legislative council while being explicitly barred from exercising “any power or 
prerogative by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England” under the state’s 1776 
constitution (Morey 29).  
 While serving in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784, James Madison 
emphasized the pitfalls of such a system, remarking that the tyranny of Great Britain had 
been replaced by the unchecked rule of Virginia’s tyrannic legislature (Sevi 81). Thomas 
Jefferson, who served as Virginia’s second governor from 1779-1781, agreed with 
Madison that Virginia’s legislative power had long outgrown appropriate bounds 
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(Monticello). In 1784 Jefferson, stated “An elective despotism [in Virginia] was not the 
government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, 
but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced” (Jefferson). 
He complained that all governmental powers “result to the legislative body,” and that the 
legislature's control of the executive was “habitual and familiar” to that of British rule 
(Jefferson). Unfortunately, Madison and Jefferson’s mutual distaste for an overarching 
legislative body was not limited to Virginia. Throughout the young American republic, 
nearly every state also struggled from with an appropriate balance of power between the 
executive and the legislative branches, with the notable exception of New York and New 
Jersey (Morey 28). 
 New York’s 1777 constitution was particularly favorable of the executive, as it 
granted the state’s governor with expansive executive powers and independence from 
legislative supremacy. This is demonstrated through George Clinton, who served as the 
state’s governor from 1777 through 1795 (Britannica). Clinton was “immensely popular” 
among New Yorkers, who considered him to be a “forceful leader and able administrator” 
of the state (Britannica). Unlike other executives in early state governments who were 
elected by the legislature, Clinton was popularly elected and did not have to seek 
approval from a legislative executive council (Morey 25). New York’s constitution 
entrusted the governor “be general and commander-in-chief of all the militia, and admiral 
of the navy of this State,” while enumerating no war or military powers to the legislature 
(Yale). 
18
 While it was initially unpopular among the newly independent states, New York’s 
constitutional model of executive power would eventually gain particular fervor among 
the other states as they grew tired of legislative mismanagement. In a letter to Governor 
Clinton in 1779, John Jay commended New York’s strong executive, and urged the 
Governor to preserve its “vigor and reputation” so that it may serve as a model for the 
other states (Sevi 83). In the Federalist 26, Alexander Hamilton proclaimed New York’s 
constitution to be “justly celebrated, both in Europe and North America, as one of the 
best forms of government established in this country” (Yale). 
 At the national level, Americans were just as frustrated with the structure of 
government. Following independence from the British Empire, the thirteen colonies were 
unified under the Articles of Confederation, the nation’s first constitution. Approved in 
1781, the Articles created a national government which vested a majority of the power 
within the individual states and a central unicameral legislative body (House). With no 
executive branch, the unicameral Congress of the Confederation was at once the nation’s 
sole legislative and executive authority (House). Under the Articles, Congress possessed 
exclusive rights over the powers of war and foreign policy. Much to the dismay of 
Alexander Hamilton and others, Congress frequently would conduct foreign policy by 
committee, often leading to disastrous results with the European powers. Addressing 
these drawbacks, Hamilton wrote: 
Congress have kept the power too much into their own hands and have meddled 
too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly a deliberative corps and 
it forgets itself when it tries to play executive. It is impossible such a body, 
numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision… 
(Villegas 66-67) 
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Additionally, Congress controlled the regulation, funding and overall command of the 
Continental Army, but lacked the authority to compel the individual states to aid in the 
war effort (Britannica). With these omissions, Congress struggled to react to unforeseen 
emergencies which required the independent authority of a strong executive to protect the 
public good. Such was the experience of Shay’s Rebellion (1786-1787), where an armed 
group of disgruntled citizens sought to overthrow the Massachusetts government through 
insurrection (Britannica). When Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin appealed to 
Congress for military assistance, Congress was unable to secure the provisions necessary 
from the individual states— including Massachusetts— to quell the rebellion 
(Britannica). As a result, Bowdoin was forced to turn to private donors, rather than the 
federal government, to raise the necessary funds to protect its people (Yazawa 15). While 
Shay’s Rebellion would eventually be subdued through Bowdoin’s privately raised 
military force, it demonstrated the pitfalls of a weak central government and executive 
branch, particularly in the matters of war. 
 While the initial reaction of the Founders and American statesmen following 
independence was to cede executive power— particularly that of the powers of war, to 
the legislative branch, the trials and tribulations sustained during the first decade of the 
American experiment necessitated a strong executive with the ability to control military 
operations. Many early-American politicians who favored legislative dominance came to 
rue frail executives and overarching legislatures. As such, mitigating the power 
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imbalances present within the young American republic became an essential goal when 
the Founders convened to frame a new Constitution. 
D. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 
 When the Founders met in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention in May 
of 1787, the Founders quickly rejected models of government which mirrored the 
legislative dominance of the Articles of Confederation (Center for the Study of the 
American Constitution). While transcripts of the entire Convention do not exist, several 
members took substantial notes on the proceedings (Yale). These notes, when coupled 
with the first draft of the Constitution, give great insight into the Founders’ original desire 
and understanding regarding the proper balance of powers between the executive and 
legislative branch— including the powers of war. 
 After months of debate, the first draft of the Constitution was presented to the 
Convention on August 6th, 1787 (Library of Congress). Referencing the successes of 
empowered executives in states such as New York, the Convention’s Committee on 
Detail designed an executive officer which wielded considerable military powers in the 
areas of operational and procedural control. Using similar syntax to that of New York’s 
constitution, the initial draft of the Constitution vested “The Executive Power of the 
United States in a single person… the President” (Library of Congress).  Additionally, the 
Committee’s draft also advanced that the President “shall be the commander in chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States” (USA-
Project). 
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 To negate fears that such powers over the military would lead to a tyrannical 
executive similar to that of Great Britain, several provisions were included within the 
initial draft which enabled the legislature to appropriately counteract the executive in the 
areas of war. For instance under Article VII of the initial draft, the Founders vested the 
power “To make war, To raise armies, To build and equip fleets,” and “To call forth the 
aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress 
insurrections, and repel invasions” to the Legislature (USA-Project). Furthermore, in 
areas of foreign affairs the draft also vested the power to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors to the Senate under Article IX (USA-Project). While being the preliminary 
draft, the inclusions of these aforementioned clauses reinforces the early desires of the 
Founders and the proper allotment of the Nation’s war powers in the final draft of the 
Constitution to come. 
 Following the Committee on Detail’s initial draft of the Constitution, the 
Convention scrupulously proceeded to debate each clause within the document, granting 
further insight into the Founders’ original understanding regarding the powers of war. By 
August 17th, the Convention centered on the clause enabling Congress to “make 
war” (Yale). Just as other debates within the Convention, exact transcripts of the August 
17th deliberations do not exist, and notes on the matter are sparse. Fortunately however, 
the notes of James Madison provide a key understanding of the Founders’ original 
understanding of the balancing of war powers. According to Madison’s notes, Charles 
Pickney of South Carolina opposed granting such power to the legislature as a whole, for 
it was too numerous in size and thus incapable of moving with the necessary speed which 
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matters of war necessitated. Rather than the legislature as a whole, Pickney instead 
advocated that the Senate would best be entrusted to control matters of making war, as 
the Senate was more acquainted with foreign affairs and smaller in member size (Yale). 
Additionally, Pickney argued that since the Senate equally represented all states and that 
all states had an equal stake in matters of the nation entering into war, the power would 
best be vested in the Senate (Yale).  
 Pierce Butler of South Carolina also held reservations for Congress’s ability to 
“make war,” albeit for different reasons (Yale). Butler, clearly favoring a stronger 
executive prerogative, held that the President alone would be best entrusted with such 
power, only to make war when “the Nation will support it” (Yale). Madison on the other 
hand, held that the clause’s syntax would grant Congress too many powers in the areas of 
war. Joined with Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Madison urged the convention to 
strike out “make” for “declare” war (Yale). In offering this amendment to the clauses 
wording, Madison and Gerry make clear that the clause was solely intended to vest the 
power of commencing formal hostilities with Congress. By striking the ability of 
Congress to “make” war, Madison and Gerry also preserved the president’s ability to 
“repel sudden attacks,” without the prior authorization of Congress as necessary to 
defend the Nation. Additionally, the striking out of the phrase also ensured that once 
Congress had declared war, it would be the president alone as commander in chief, who 
would control the military operations. As such, while the power to declare war is vested 
with the legislature, the power to make war—as understood by the Founders— is solely a 
function of the president under his powers as commander in chief. 
23
 Following nearly five weeks of intense debate over the initial draft of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Convention voted in favor of the proposed document on 
September 17, 1787 (Library of Congress). Illustrating the Founders’ dominating 
sentiments garnered through their own experiences under British rule, the final 
Constitution sought to prevent a single branch from unilaterally controlling the Nation’s 
war powers. While some areas were designed to limit legislative influence, such as in the 
process of electing the president, the Founders prescribed an institutional balance of the 
Nation’s war powers between the legislative and executive branch. To the Founders, the 
institutional powers prescribed under the Constitution would appropriately serve to 
counteract one another, particularly in areas of war. While the Constitution granted the 
president with a strong executive prerogative in times of war, particularly through 
operational control of the military, the Constitution enabled Congress to appropriately 
check such power under Article I. Under Article I, the legislative branch was vested the 
power to declare war; the power to raise and support the military forces of the Nation 
through appropriation; the power to make rules for the governing and regulation the 
Nation’s land and naval forces; the power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of 
the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and the ability to provide for the 
organization, arming, and disciplining of the Militia, as well as the authority to train the 
Militia, according to such discipline as prescribed by Congress (Cornell). Additionally, 
the Constitution sought to prevent a tyrannical executive by limiting the term of the 
president to four years (Article II, § 1, Clause 1), and through legislative powers over 
impeachment. In cases of impeachment, the House of Representatives would be able to 
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“choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment” 
(Article I, § 2, Clause 5). If impeached by the House, the Senate, would then “have the 
sole Power to try” the impeachment charges against the president, under the supervision 
of the the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who would preside over such a trial (Article 
I, § 3, Clauses 6-7). According to the Constitution, a president may only be found guilty 
and thus removed from office “for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” (Article II, § 4).  
E. The Federalist Papers  
 Following the Constitutional Convention, the newly-proposed Constitution would 
now be sent to the various states for ratification, a process which James Madison felt 
would forever decide “the fate of republican government” throughout the world (Library 
of Congress). While the proposed Constitution sought to eliminate the various pitfalls of 
the Articles of Confederation, not everyone was ready for such a change. With memories 
of British oppression fresh within their minds, opponents of the proposed Constitution, 
chiefly known as the Anti-Federalists, feared that the document gave far too much power 
to the executive branch. In order to dispel such fears and encourage a well-functioning 
federal government, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay authored The 
Federalist Papers. Throughout The Federalist Papers, various essays provide a direct 
assessment on war powers under the Constitution, offering a unique view into the minds 
of several of the most influential Founders. 
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 In Federalist 8, Hamilton argues the Constitution is more likely to create a state 
of peace, even without expressly prohibiting standing armies within its text. Many within 
the young American Republic feared the possibility of standing armies due to their own 
experiences under British rule and a knowledge of European history. Without the unity 
provided by the constitution’s ratification, Hamilton contends perpetual warfare could run 
rampant among the individual states, much like that of Europe. Specifically, Hamilton 
believes less-populous states would likely be threatened by the populous larger states in 
such a situation, which would turn to drastic measures to maintain their defense: 
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of 
government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive 
direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at 
the expense of the legislative authority. (Yale) 
In other words, without the provisions of the constitution, extreme defenses would likely 
catalyze oppressive government practices. According to Hamilton’s explanation, war is 
expressly an activity for the executive branch. He explains that the nature of war requires 
the powers of government to largely be concentrated under the executive in times of war 
in order to protect the nation. He warns however, that as executive power increases, the 
executive branch will continuously usurp powers from the legislature under the notion of 
defense. Through an understanding of historical precedent, Hamilton argues that it is the 
duty of the legislature to ensure that a war does not run in perpetuity, as the government 
would be effectively run by a single executive in such in times of war. Such should be 
avoided by the legislature, in order to ensure that the will of the Nation is not discarded 
for the that of a single ruler. In war especially, a single executive—armed with additional 
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authority— would have a greater chance to oppress the liberties of the people through 
unilateral and tyrannic actions. 
 In Federalist 24, Hamilton argues that a standing military force would be 
necessary to defend the young nation, even while not seemingly engaged in conflict. He 
necessitates that proper defense of the nation requires a peacetime professional military 
force to adequately defend attacks from the established European powers and to guard the 
Western frontier. While to some this may be understood as the president having unlimited 
powers over this standing force, Hamilton argues the opposite. According to Hamilton, 
control over such forces lies with the legislature and, thus, the people, as the legislative 
branch has the power to raise and support such forces as regarded fit. Hamilton knew that 
such power was just as dangerous to liberty in the hands of many versus a single 
executive. This is why, according to Hamilton, that Congress shall not appropriate 
funding to support the military for a period longer than two years so that a unitary 
executive is not enabled to subject the Nation to tyrannic practices which may arise in 
war (Yale).  
 In Federalist 26, Hamilton yet again revisits the debate over standing armies. In 
this case, Hamilton addresses fears that once in possession of such a standing force, the 
executive would circumvent the legislature’s appropriation power by using “resources in 
that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the 
legislature” (Yale). Hamilton argues that such would not be the case, as any long standing 
force would only be the product of necessity through the legislature and therefor the 
people. The Constitution only allows for the president to mobilize forces in the event of 
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insurrection or when it is necessary to defend the public interest. According to Hamilton, 
such would rarely be the case however, as the Constitution provides is designed to 
promote unity among the Nation (Yale). In attempting to describe the appropriate 
balances of power between the legislative and the executive branches concerning war, it 
is important to note that Hamilton never questions the executive branch’s role in 
conducting the operations and tactical decisions of war. However, he does assert that such  
operative power should not be exercised in the absence of legislative approval. 
 In Federalist 69, Hamilton explains the “real characters of the proposed 
Executive” as devised through the Convention, to dispel fears that an empowered 
executive would turn tyrannous under the proposed Constitution (Yale). To do so, 
Hamilton frequently compares and contrasts the executive authority granted under New 
York and Great Britain’s constitutional models, giving additional evidence that the 
Founders considered the individual experiences of the states Constitutional Convention 
deliberations.  As explained in the prior section of this chapter, New York’s Governor was 
among the strongest executives in the young United States. While Hamilton believed that 
New York’s government should be “justly celebrated, both in Europe and North America, 
as one of the best forms of government established in this country” (Federalist 26), he 
understood that such executive authority continued to be perceived by many as a threat to 
liberty. Hamilton takes careful consideration to negate such fears in Federalist 69, 
specifically in the area of war powers, where the power of the president “would be 
inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor” (Yale). 
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 Hamilton explains that the president’s authority as commander in chief of the 
army and navy “would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but 
in substance much inferior to it” (Yale). As for the substance of the president’s war 
powers, Hamilton explains: 
It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while 
that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING 
and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under 
consideration, would appertain to the legislature. (Yale) 
Hamilton makes an important clarification on presidential war powers. Through the 
Commander in Chief clause, the president wields king-like control over military 
operations. Such is different than that of Great Britain however, in that the president is 
only able to exercise such powers following authorization from the legislature. While 
these powers may appear similar to that of the king of Great Britain, they are indeed 
different. First, although the president may make take operational advice from those 
within his appointed Cabinet, the final decisions ultimately fall to the president as the 
Commander in Chief. This contrasts with the king, who is free to make expansive 
unilateral decisions on the military as a whole, including the raising and regulation of 
fleets and armies, without regard to an executive council or legislative body. Additionally, 
while the king may unilaterally declare war, the president would be prohibited from 
doing so under the Constitution, as the president would be prohibited from unilaterally 
declaring war and raising or regulating armed forces. Through equal representation in the 
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Senate, Hamilton emphasizes that a declaration of war would only be authorized when 
the will of the nation as a whole, and not that of a single executive, supported it. 
 In Federalist 70, Hamilton reinforces the necessity for a unitary executive. To 
Hamilton, a unitary executive best ensures governmental accountability, and 
independence from legislative encroachments on executive power, and enables energy 
within the executive (Yale). Of these factors, Hamilton placed considerable attention 
towards discussing the necessity for energy within the executive, writing: 
Energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks…to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property…
to justice; [and] to the security of liberty…. (Yale) 
Hamilton believes that through Federalist 70, the pitfalls of the plural executive scheme 
will be readily apparent to his reader. According to Hamilton, a plural executive would 
lead to internal quarreling among the branch between the various executive officers. 
Unlike the deliberative nature which benefits the legislative branch, Hamilton asserts that 
no “favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the 
executive department” (Yale). Hamilton believes such quarrels only serve to “embarrass 
or weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate,” therefor negating 
the most necessary qualities of the executive—vigor and expedition, without anything 
positive in return (Yale). According to Hamilton, energy within the executive was most 
necessary in instances of foreign attacks against the United States, where it served as the 
ultimate “bulwark of the national security” (Yale). He contends that defensive military 
action in response to attacks on the United States is the sole instance in which the 
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executive may order military action without congressional authorization. As illustrated in 
the subsequent chapters, modern presidents have selectively interpreted Hamilton’s 
argument regarding energy in the executive to be so important that it precedes that of 
legislative authority over war powers. Modern presidential practice forgets however, that 
such swiftness is meant to be pursued solely in response to attacks against the United 
States when the situation necessitates immediate defensive counteraction.  
 These aforementioned essays allow for greater clarity regarding the intentions of 
the Founders when framing the constitutional government. To the Founders, complicating 
the executive branch’s design through excessive checks and inherent weaknesses would 
be a recipe ripe of idiocy. After a decade of legislative oppression under the Articles of 
Confederation, the Founders well understood the necessity of an empowered executive 
branch, who could operate decisively and independently to carry out the office. Many of 
the executive powers— particularly those in regards to the operations of war, were best in 
the hands of one rather than in many. Of course, such empowerment of the executive 
branch would not be without appropriate checks. The Founders considered the power of 
impeachment, frequent turnover of offices, and due dependence on the people for 
reelection as appropriate checks to prevent the rise of a tyrannical executive like that of 
King George III. Additionally, the executive was to be prohibited from commencing 
hostilities like that of the British monarch. In accordance with the execution of the law, 
the president would only be able to direct military operations following legislative 
authorization to do so. Once a war or conflict was commenced however, the Founders 
sought it necessary to eliminate many of the possibilities in which a legislature could 
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interfere with the operational command of the military. The legislature could limit the 
president’s war powers in other ways however, through their power over appropriations 
and over the raising of the military (except in cases of insurrection).  
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, it was understood by the Founders that war 
should only be conducted when the will of the Nation as a whole supported it. This 
understanding of good governance stood in stark contrast to that of the British monarch, 
who held the unilateral power to declare war without regard from the legislature and thus 
the people. In order to ensure that such unilateral decision-making would not be enabled 
under the government of the United States, the power to declare war was vested to the 
deliberative body directly accountable to the people— Congress. If the actions of 
Congress regarding war were not popular with the Nation, the Founders knew that the 
people could effectively make their voice heard through the electoral process and 
eliminate unpopular and unjust wars. Supporting such intent, James Madison, who would 
later enact the Nation’s first declaration of war as president, wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 
1798, stating: 
The constitution supposes, what the History of all governments demonstrates, 
that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone 
to it. It has, accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the 
Legislature. (James Madison, 1798.) 
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Chapter II: The Founders’ Intentions at Work (1789-1942) 
The constitution vests the power of declaring war in Congress; 
therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be 
undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the 
subject and authorized such a measure. 
             —President George Washington (1793.)
Even as the British-born leaders of the America’s founding generation were gradually 
replaced by subsequent generations of native-born Americans, American leadership 
largely adhered to the Founders’ intentions concerning war powers through the United 
States’ introduction into the Second World War. Consequently, following the ratification 
of the Constitution in 1789 until 1942, the institutional relationship designed by the 
Founders concerning the balance of the Nation’s war powers largely remained 
unchanged. While there are exceptions during this period, the vast majority of military 
operations were carried out in adherence to the Founders’ intentions. 
A. Congressional Declarations of War 
 From the days of the Washington Administration to the present, there have been 
eleven separate formal declarations of war by Congress, collectively encompassing a total 
of five separate wars— the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-
American War, World War I, and World War II. 
 As demonstrated through Table 1, which outlines each formal congressional 
declaration of war throughout United States history, each declaration was enacted during 
the period in which this chapter is scoped, with the first instance authorizing hostilities 
against Great Britain in the War of 1812 (Senate). Throughout the nineteenth century, 
each declaration of war was passed as a bill, while declarations of war during the 
twentieth century were passed as joint resolutions by Congress (Elsea and Weed 1). 
Even though the power to declare war is explicitly a legislative function per the 
Constitution, Congress has never exercised the power on its own. Instead, each American 
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declaration of war has been preceded by a presidential appeal for Congress to act. By way 
of either a written statement or a speech before a joint session of Congress, presidents 
have appealed to Congress for action by outlining their specific rationale which they 
believed warranted a declaration of war (Elsea and Weed 1-2). Within these appeals, 
presidents have cited the necessity for defensive action following direct armed attacks on 
American citizens, territory, or the rights and interests of the United States as a sovereign 
nation (Elsea and Weed 1). Following an appeal from the president to declare war, each 
declaration was then passed by majority vote within the House of Representatives and the 
Senate before being sent back to the president for final approval and signage (Elsea and 
Weed 1). The most recent declaration of war by the United States was against Rumania 
(modern day Romania) on June 5, 1942 during World War II (Senate). 
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Table 1: Congressional Declarations of War
War Opponent(s) Date of Declaration President
War of 1812 Great Britain June 18, 1812 James Madison
Mexican-American War Mexico May 12, 1846 James K. Polk
Spanish-American War Spain April 25, 1898 William McKinley
World War I
Germany April 6, 1917
Woodrow Wilson
Austria-Hungary December 7, 1917
World War II
Japan December 8, 1941
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Germany December 11, 1941
Italy December 11, 1941
Bulgaria June 4, 1942
Hungary June 4, 1942
Rumania June 4, 1942
Source(s): “Official Declarations of War by Congress.” United States Senate, United States Senate 
Office, 10 Apr. 2019.
 Table 2 details the respective timeline for each formal declaration of war 
throughout United States history, from the president’s initial appeal to Congress to its 
enactment. With exception of President Woodrow Wilson’s request for a congressional 
declaration of war against Germany in World War I, which was first passed by the Senate, 
each declaration of war was first passed in the House of Representatives before being 
approved by Senate (Elsea and Weed 4). In several instances, the process of formally 
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War of 1812 James Madison June 1, 1812 
(Great Britain)
June 4, 1812 
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(174-14)







April 25, 1898 April 25, 1898 
(310-6)






April 2, 1917 
(Germany)
April 6, 1917 
(373-50)
















































June 2, 1942 
(Bulgaria)
June 3, 1942 
(357-0)
June 4, 1942 
(73-0)
June 5, 1942
June 2, 1942 
(Hungary)
June 3, 1942 
(360-0)
June 4, 1942 
(73-0)
June 5, 1942
June 2, 1942 
(Rumania)
June 3, 1942 
(361-0)
June 4, 1942 
(73-0)
June 5, 1942
Source(s): Elsea, Jennifer K., and Matthew C. Weed. “Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use 
of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.” Congressional Research Service, the 
Library of Congress, 2014.
declaring war has been accomplished in a single day following the request of the 
president. For example, in the case of the declaration of war against Spain authorizing the 
Spanish-American War, and the three separate declarations of war against Japan, 
Germany, and Italy which authorized the involvement of American military forces in 
World War II, Congress acted expediently on the request of the president by sending such 
a declaration to his desk for approval within the same day. In the following pages of this 
study, several of these formal declarations will be briefly examined to illustrate how they 
comport with the Founders’ intentions regarding war powers. 
 Over two decades following the ratification of the Constitution, the constitutional 
process for formally declaring war would be tested for the first time against Great Britain 
in the War of 1812. On June 1, 1812, President James Madison sent a message to 
Congress outlining the hostile acts of Great Britain towards the United States (Elsea and 
Weed 4). In his message, Madison chiefly denounced the British for their impressment of 
American seamen, their violation of American waters, and their implementation of a 
“sweeping system of illegal blockades” within his message to Congress (Hickey 40). 
While Madison’s message is considered the first instance in which an American president 
recommended a congressional declaration of war, Madison never actually explicitly 
recommended such action, fearing accusations of executive influence in the legislative 
duty to declare war (Hickey 41). The crux of his message to Congress however, was 
clear: “We behold . . . on the side of Great Britain… a state of war against the United 
States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Britain” (Hickey 41). 
While not explicitly calling for a declaration of war, Madison argued that to the British, a 
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state of war already existed and it was time for the Nation to defend itself against these 
repeated aggressions. In response, the House of Representatives and the Senate both 
voted to declare against Great Britain (Yale). Perhaps due to Congress being comprised of 
the founding generation being most familiar with the perils of war, the vote to formally 
declare war against Great Britain in 1812 remains the closest such vote in United States 
history. When the institutional balance concerning formal declarations of war was first 
tested in 1812, the founding generation set an important precedent for declarations to 
follow, by properly adhering to the constitutional prescription. While Madison could very 
well have used force in response to British attacks on American commerce and argue that 
it was defensive in nature, he did not. By choosing to appeal to Congress prior to ordering 
military force in 1812, Madison’s actions further solidify that the founding generation did 
not believe that the president should wield such power unilaterally. 
 While each declaration of war adhered to the appropriate institutional prescription 
of the Founders by being approved by Congress and enacted by the president, there are 
certain anomalies pertaining to the preceding events which catalyzed certain declarations. 
An example of such an instance is the events which led President James K. Polk to 
request a congressional declaration of war with Mexico in 1846. Previously a territory of 
Mexico, Texas won its independence in 1836 through an armed rebellion against the 
Mexican government known as the Texas Revolution (Wallenfeldt). In 1845, Congress 
annexed and subsequently granted Texas statehood, an act which inevitably placed the 
United States and Mexico on a path towards war (Waxman). When Congress annexed 
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Texas, it also inherited an unresolved border dispute concerning the rightful border 
between Mexico and Texas (Waxman).  
 Rather than seeing the disputed area which comprised the territory between the 
Nueces and the Rio Grande as a potential issue, President James K. Polk saw the territory 
as an opportunity to further American territorial expansion (Waxman). Shortly after Texas 
was admitted as a state, Polk deliberately worsened the border crisis by sending U.S. 
Army units into the disputed territory to serve as bait for Mexican forces present in the 
area (Waxman). In what is likely the greatest instance of a president aiming to unilaterally 
start a formal war, Polk still acted with respect to the institutional balance of war powers 
as prescribed within the Constitution. Polk knew that in the absence of a formal 
declaration of war from Congress, he would not be authorized to the necessary actions to 
fulfill his ultimate goal of territorial expansion of the United States. Knowing that he 
would need the approval of Congress to constitutionally conduct war as Commander in 
Chief, Polk had already drafted a declaration of war to present to Congress prior to even 
sending U.S. forces into the region (Waxman). Polk knew that if American blood was 
drawn by a seeming act of Mexican aggression, public pressure would force Congress to 
declare war against Mexico (Waxman). Sure enough, when Mexican forces attacked U.S. 
forces in the territory, Polk’s gamble paid off. On May 11, 1846, Polk gave his 
presidential appeal to Congress to declare war on Mexico, stating that Mexico had 
“invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our own soil” (Elsea 
and Weed 4, Fisher 1). Responding to a “glow of patriotic fervor” (Lindsey), Congress 
authorized the declaration against Mexico, which was signed by Polk on May 13, 1846 
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(Elsea and Weed 4). While Congress declared war against Mexico, it did not do so 
without reservations. On January 3, 1848, the House of Representatives passed an 
amendment censuring Polk for “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally” beginning the 
Mexican-American War (Fisher 5). In doing so, Congress asserted its authority, making 
clear that they believed Polk’s use of troops without authorization was a constitutional 
violation. The amendment passed by a vote of 85-81 (Fisher 5). Curiously, among those 
who voted in favor of the measure was then-freshman lawmaker Abraham Lincoln 
(Fisher 5). While Polk’s provocative actions seemingly forced Congress towards 
declaring war, the institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers were still properly 
executed in the authorization of the Mexican-American War. It was Congress after all, 
which declared war with Mexico, and the president who executed such authorization by 
controlling military operations as commander in chief. 
 The circumstances which preceded President McKinley's request to Congress for 
a declaration against Spain also present abnormalities which are worth investigating. In 
the months prior to McKinley’s appeal for authorization, an explosion onboard the U.S 
Maine claimed the lives of 268 American servicemen in Havana Harbor, in the Spanish 
colony of Cuba, on February 5th, 1898 (pbs). Over a month later on March 28th, the 
United States Naval Court of Inquiry ruled that the explosion was likely caused by a 
submerged mine in the Harbor (pbs). While formal blame was never officially placed on 
the Spanish for the explosion, public pressure for American military retaliation against 
Spain in Cuba began to skyrocket (pbs). In response to the mounting pressure for action, 
the U.S. presented an ultimatum to Spain which demanded it withdraw its military forces 
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from Cuba and recognize its independence as a sovereign nation (Elsea and Weed 2). The 
ultimatum, which was supported by a joint resolution of Congress, authorized the 
President to use the Nation’s military forces to achieve these demands, if necessary (Elsea 
and Weed 2). When presented, the ultimatum for Cuban independence was swiftly 
rejected by the Spanish government. Only after Spain rejected the ultimatum did 
McKinley, who already had congressional authorization to use the Nation’s military 
forces against Spain, appeal to Congress for a declaration of war. In essence, the decision 
to authorize the use of the Nation’s military forces in the Spanish-American War was 
done to remove the Spanish from Cuba— in order to defend the interests of the United 
States. Unlike other declarations, it was not enacted in retaliation for an evident attack on 
American territory, sovereignty, military forces, or its citizens (Elsea and Weed 2). While 
it stands alone in its reasoning for doing so, the declaration of war against Spain was still 
done in respect to the constitutional process for doing so. While McKinley had 
authorization to use military force prior, he nonetheless sought a declaration of war from 
Congress. McKinley’s actions reinforce the notion of the time, that in order for a 
president to conduct meaningful war-making operations against another nation, he could 
not do so in the absence of a formal declaration of war. 
 In stark contrast to the declaration of war with Spain, congressional formal 
declarations of war during the twentieth century stemmed directly from evident attacks 
against American territory, military forces, citizens, or sovereignty. While the United 
States had worked to remain neutral throughout much of the First World War, Germany’s 
decision to reengage in unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral American vessels 
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(which it had previously agreed to halt) was viewed as an egregious attack on American 
sovereignty and its citizens (Elsea and Weed 2). In his request to Congress on April 2, 
1917, Wilson argued that the war had been “thrust upon the United States” through 
Germany’s repeated assault on American lives and the Nation’s sovereign right to 
neutrality (Elsea and Weed 2). Although Wilson signed the declaration of war against 
Germany following its passage through Congress on April 6, he negated to do the same 
with Austria-Hungary, Germany’s most prominent ally in the war, until they became an 
active threat against the United States (Elsea and Weed 2).  
 While each presidential request to Congress to declare war was grounded in 
defense, none is more appropriate than the declaration which catapulted American 
involvement into the Second World War. While the United States once again aimed to 
remain neutral, it would once again be thrust into war by defensive means. When the 
Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor and other American Pacific-based military 
instillations on December 7, 1941, it directly attacked American territory, military forces, 
civilians, as well as the rights and interests of the United States as a sovereign nation 
(Elsea and Weed 2-3). Consequently, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested a 
congressional declaration against Japan the following day, Congress obliged the request 
by swiftly passing the declaration through both chambers and returning it to the 
Roosevelt for signage the same day (Senate). With the exception of the declaration of war 
against Spain in 1898, never before had a formal United States declaration of war been 
enacted with such expediency. Unlike the circumstances prior to the declaration of war 
with Spain which presumed war, the egregious Japanese attacks on December 7, 1941 
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were an unprecedented surprise to the Nation and its leadership. Even in the case of 
extreme uncertainty, America’s leadership rose to the challenge necessitated by the will 
of Nation as the Founders intended. When both Germany and Italy each declared war 
against the United States in the following days, America’s leadership once again acted 
with the expediency required to adequately defend the Nation. On December 11, 1941, 
following a presidential request, Congress passed two joint resolutions declaring a state 
of war against Germany and Italy, which were signed yet again signed into force by 
President Roosevelt the same day (Senate). 
B. Congressional Informal Declarations of War 
 Aside from the instances in which the United States has formally declared war, 
there have been many instances in which Congress has statutorily authorized the 
President to use military force since the ratification of the Constitution. While these 
congressional authorizations for the use of military force, also known as informal 
declarations of war, are not explicitly included within the Constitution itself, the practice 
was invented by the Founders themselves as they steered the Nation in the post-
ratification era. Through an investigation into these early instances of congressional 
authorizations for the use of military force, while not expressly mentioned within the 
Constitution, it is clear that the Founders intended congressional authorizations for the 
presidential use of military force to closely mirror the constitutional practice of formally 
declaring war. In most cases, like formal declarations of war, congressional statutory 
authorizations for the president to use military force have been preceded by a presidential 
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request to Congress for action. Following an appeal from the president, congressional 
authorizations follow the exact same process as formal declarations of war— they must 
be voted on and passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and then 
sent back to the president for his ultimate approval. The chief distinction between a 
formal declaration of war and a congressional authorization for presidential use of use 
military force how such power is delegated to the President. When congress has formally 
declared war, as demonstrated through a majority of such declarations, the Nation is 
thereby thrust into a state of war with that nation. Following a declaration of war, the 
president is then able to use the all available military resources at his disposal as deemed 
necessary as commander in chief to execute such a declaration. When congress 
authorizes the presidential use of force via informal declarations, the president may then 
use his commander in chief powers pursuant to the specific scope defined by Congress. 
Throughout the nineteenth century to through the Second World War, American 
leadership largely adhered to the proper exercise of these congressional authorizations, by 
limiting the power of the president to exercise his commander in chief powers solely in 
pursuit of the authorizations scope and provisions. 
 In what would later be known as the Quasi-War (1798-1800), an undeclared war 
with France, President John Adams would be the first president to receive congressional 
authorization for military action against a foreign state. Despite officially being neutral in 
the European conflict between Great Britain and France in the decade following 
ratification, American commercial vessels were frequently seized by French naval forces. 
In response to this blatant disregard for the United States’ sovereign right to neutrality by 
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the French government, President Adams appealed to Congress on multiple occasions to 
enact legislation which would enable an appropriate response. Specifically, Adams sought 
the authorization for the U.S. Navy to defend against attacks on American citizens and 
commerce abroad (Elsea and Weed 5-6). Heeding the call of President Adams, Congress 
subsequently passed legislation which aimed to “more effectually to protect the 
Commerce and Coasts of the United States” by authorizing the President to instruct the 
American naval commanders to act against any armed vessel attempting to commit such 
“depredations” on any vessel belonging to the United States of its citizens (Elsea and 
Weed 6). In the event of the capture of a vessel belonging to the United States or its 
citizens, the legislation also authorized the President to direct American naval forces to 
retake such vessel by force (Elsea and Weed 6). President Adams signed this legislation 
into affect on May 28, 1798. Months later, Congress passed additional legislation which 
furthered the President’s authority and specifically addressed French attacks on American 
sovereignty and its citizens. Signed into law by Adams on July 9, 1798, this secondary 
legislation authorized the President to instruct U.S. Naval forces and commanders to 
attack and capture any French naval vessel found to be within the “jurisdictional limits of 
the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas” (Elsea and Weed 6). Further, the 
congressional authorization of July 9, 1798 also enabled the President to grant the owners 
of privately-owned armed American vessels to recapture any vessel, goods, and property 
belonging to the United States and its citizens, while also granting them the authority to 
attack any armed French vessel (Elsea and Weed 6). While the authorizations which 
enabled the President to take action against France in the Quasi-War were unprecedented 
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in American history, President Adams appropriately acted solely in pursuant of the scope 
of the authorizations. 
 The events of the Quasi-War led to several significant Supreme Court rulings 
regarding the institutional balance of war powers. While they preceded Marbury v. 
Madison (1803) which established judicial review, the Supreme Court rulings in Bas v. 
Tingy (1800) and Talbot v. Seeman (1801) provide significant insight into the judicial 
branch’s view that only Congress could authorize hostilities (Justia). According to the 
rulings, Congress could authorize hostilities by a formal declaration of war, or as it had 
done against France through legislation which permitted an undeclared war. These points 
are underscored by Justice Samuel Chase, whose opinion in Bas read:  
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited 
war, limited in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its 
extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a 
part of the law of nations, but if a partial war is waged, its extent and operation 
depend on our municipal laws.… [in the case against France] Congress has not 
declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on the high 
seas by certain persons in certain cases. (Justia) 
Through Justice Chase’s opinion in Bas, it is very clear that Congress has authority in 
war-making, regardless of how that war originates. Congress may either refuse to 
authorize the war, or to write narrow laws in response. 
 Soon after the conflict with France, foreign attacks on U.S. commerce and 
shipping would yet again prompt American Presidents to seek congressional approval for 
the use of military force. Following attacks on U.S. vessels by Tripoli, Alexander 
Hamilton, being a staunch advocate of executive power, argued that the president could 
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act without the consent of Congress in such instance because Tripoli had already declared 
war on the United States (Ramsey 5). Once war existed by means of another party, 
Hamilton argued that the president, through his constitutional requirement towards 
defense, had unilateral and unlimited authority towards the use of the Nation’s military 
forces (Ramsey 5). Even following Hamilton’s arguments concerning executive power, 
President Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that any military measure beyond those in the 
line of defense would require congressional approval (Ramsey 5). In his appeal to 
Congress in December of 1801, Jefferson argued that it would be prudent for Congress 
respond to Tripoli’s repeated attacks on U.S. vessels by authorizing the U.S. Navy to take 
defensive and offensive responsive measures. On February 6, 1802, Congress authorized 
the President to direct all available naval forces and even privately-owned armed vessels 
“for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the 
Mediterranean and adjoining seas” (Elsea and Weed 6). In 1815, President James 
Madison recognizing repeated Algerian acts of “overt and direct warfare against the 
citizens of the United States,” recommended that Congress declare the “existence of a 
state of war between the United States and the Dey and Regency of Algiers” (Elsea and 
Weed 7). In this instance, Madison was denied a declaration of war. Instead, Congress 
passed authorization for the President to use the Navy at his discretion in pursuance of 
the protection of American seaman and commerce “Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean 
and adjoining seas” against Algeria (Elsea and Weed 7). While the early nineteenth 
century authorizations against the North African states of Tripoli and Algeria were against 
relatively minor adversaries and mainly pertained naval operations, they nonetheless 
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demonstrate that no “material use” of the Nation’s military forces were undertaken by the 
Founders themselves as president without prior congressional approval (Ramsey 5).  
 Finally, the actions of Congress to suppress acts of piracy against American 
vessels from 1819 to 1823 warrant investigation to the historical evaluation of war 
powers. In this instance, congressional authorization was in direct response to a growing 
number of petitions from American shippers to Congress for the protection of their 
property and seamen from acts of piracy throughout Caribbean and Latin American 
waters (Elsea and Weed 7). Congress authorized the President to direct the commanders 
of public armed vessels of the United States to protect “the merchant vessels of the 
United States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations” (Elsea and 
Weed 7). The congressional authorization against piracy is significant it illustrates an 
instance in which the Founding generation authorized the president to use military force 
in the absence of prior presidential request to do so. 
C. The Civil War 
 No historical evaluation of the Nation’s adherence to the Founders’ constitutional 
prescription regarding powers of war would be complete without an examination of the 
American Civil War (1861-1865). Perhaps the most defining event in the history of the 
United States, the American Civil War divided the Nation against itself, turned family 
against family, and resulted in an unprecedented loss of American life. Prior to the 
Vietnam War, the total number of Americans forces killed in the Civil War— over 
624,000 Union and Confederate soldiers— exceeded that of every American war 
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combined (Ohio State University). Even through the present day, the American Civil War 
continues to remain as the deadliest conflict in American history. Aside from the 
tremendous loss of American life, the Civil War also made considerable impacts on the 
historical exercise of the Nation’s war powers, albeit not through a substantial change to 
the institutional balance of such powers as prescribed by the Founders. Rather, the 
circumstances of the Civil War provided key insight into the commander in chief powers 
of the president in instances of insurrection. 
 While the Civil War was the deadliest conflict in American history, the American 
Civil War was not actually a “war” in the constitutional sense, but rather an insurrection 
against the United States government. Following the secession of numerous southern 
states to form the Confederate States of America (CSA), the American Civil War 
officially began with the Confederate bombardment of Union forces at Ft. Sumter, South 
Carolina on April 12, 1861 (American Battlefield Trust). Following the attack on Ft. 
Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln was not able to receive congressional authorization 
to act as Congress was not in session and thus unable to do so. Nonetheless, President 
Lincoln was determined to uphold his oath of affirmation to “preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution of the United States,” as outlined in Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 
of the Constitution, by taking appropriate action (Cornell).  
 Although Lincoln was operating under a case of insurrection rather than war, it is 
important to note his that his actions during the Civil War established crucial precedent 
regarding the presidency’s wartime authorities. Lincoln, a man of deep principle and 
constitutional understanding, aimed to fulfill this presidential oath of affirmation to 
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defend the Constitution and federal government by using all executive powers at his 
disposal, even without prior authorization from Congress. Three days later on April 15, 
President Lincoln issued a public proclamation that an insurrection against the United 
States government existed and called forth the various militia’s of the states to raise 
75,000 troops in order to subdue the rebellion (Senate). Lincoln’s proclamation also 
summoned Congress to convene in a special session beginning on July 4, 1861, “to 
consider, and determine, such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety, and 
interest, may seem to demand” (Senate). Entrenched in his position that the Confederacy 
was in open rebellion against the United States, Lincoln did not appeal to Congress to 
declare war. Lincoln believed that such a declaration would be equivalent to recognizing 
the Confederate States as an independent nation, which could subsequently rally 
international support to the southern cause (Center for Civic Education).  
 On April 19th, Lincoln ordered the enactment of a naval blockade of major 
Southern ports to cut off the Confederacy’s ability to receive supplies and materiel critical 
to their war effort (Department of State). While Lincoln understood that his order had 
important legal ramifications as a nation would just close its ports rather than blockade 
them, he believed his actions were just (Center for Civic Education). In the months 
following Lincoln’s order to establish an official blockade of southern ports, foreign 
governments began to recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent in the Civil War 
(Department of State).  
 On April 27th, 1861, following notice of a plot to destroy vital railroad tracks 
between Annapolis and Philadelphia by a group of Maryland-based Confederate 
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sympathizers, Lincoln again tested his executive war power by unilaterally suspending 
the writ of habeas corpus in Maryland— a state which had remained within the Union 
(Dueholm). According to Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, known as the Suspension Clause, 
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” (Cornell). Nearly a 
month later, Union troops arrested John Merryman in Cockeysville, Maryland for 
“recruiting, training, and leading a drill company for Confederate service” (Dueholm). 
Immediately following his arrest, Merryman’s lawyer petitioned Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney, who was sitting as a federal circuit court judge, for a writ of 
habeas corpus (Britannica). Following deliberations on the matter, Taney subsequently 
issued a writ on the grounds that Merryman was being illegally detained at Fort McHenry 
(Britannca). Following Taney’s grant, General George Cadwalader, the commander of 
Fort McHenry’s presiding officer, refused to obey the writ, claiming that the President’s 
orders superseded Taney’s (Britannica). Following Cadwalader’s refusal, Taney cited him 
for contempt of court on May 28, ruling that the president did not have the power to 
suspend the writ (Dueholm). In what would be known as Ex Parte Merryman (1861), 
Chief Justice Taney issued an opinion days later stating that because the limitation on 
suspension only appeared within Article I, which deals solely with legislative powers, 
only Congress had the ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (Dueholm). In spite of 
the ruling in Merryman, Lincoln continued his order. 
 In his address to the special session of Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln sought 
the endorsement of Congress for his unprecedented exercise of war powers, claiming that 
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none of his actions were “done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress” as 
“no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist 
force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation” (Center for Civic 
Education). On the suspension of writ, Lincoln justified his actions on the basis that “we 
have a case of rebellion, and the public safety does require” such a suspension per the 
Constitution, which does not expressly specify who must exercise such power 
(Dueholm). Even without prior approval for his exercise of war powers, following 
Lincoln’s appeal, Congress subsequently passed legislation authorizing his presidential 
use of war powers against the insurrection (Center for Civic Education).  
 In 1863, Lincoln’s actions would continue to expand executive power in cases of 
insurrection, through Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress yet again authorized the 
expansion of executive war power through its passing of the Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Act. The Act officially authorized the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and 
simultaneously released Lincoln and those who acted upon his order from any liability 
for having done so without prior approval from Congress (Dueholm). Under the authority 
granted to him by Congress, Lincoln yet again suspended the writ of habeas corpus six 
months later by expanding his order to the entire Union (Dueholm). That same year, the 
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of Lincoln’s order to blockade southern ports in the 
Prize Cases (1863). In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the President’s 
decision impose a blockade was indeed constitutional (Justia). The majority opinion of 
the Court in the Prize Cases concluded that to constitute war, it was not unnecessary for 
the Confederacy to be acknowledged as an independent nation. Additionally, while 
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Congress had retroactively approved of Lincoln’s actions through subsequent 
authorization, according to the Constitution, “…The President was bound to meet it [the 
war] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a 
name,” according to the majority (Justia). In siding with Lincoln’s expanse of executive 
power, the Supreme Court cemented the executive power to act decisively and 
expediently in times of war in the absence of prior congressional approval, regardless if 
the opponent of the United States was recognized as an independent nation or sovereign 
state (Oyez). 
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 For nearly 160 years following the ratification of the Constitution, the Nation’s 
leaders largely adhered to the institutional relationship of war powers devised by the 
Founders. During this span, presidents would most always request authorization in a prior 
appeal to Congress prior to using military force. In most cases, Congress would heed the 
call of the president, and subsequently grant military authorization through a formal 
declaration of war or appropriate legislative statutes. Following World War II, the 
institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers began to dramatically shift towards the 
presidency. Though largely gained through unilateral action, the expanse of presidential 
war powers throughout the last seven decades is also largely the product of Congress 
abdicating its constitutional role in the process through inaction and appeasement. Since 
the final declaration of war against Rumania in 1942, the use of the Nation’s military 
forces have seldom followed the Founders’ prescription regarding the commencement of 
hostilities through prior statutory authorization from Congress. Modern practice indicates 
that the president most often commences military action by introducing U.S. military 
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Chapter III: The Imperial Presidency (1942-Present) 
In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong 
had attacked the weak… Communism was acting in Korea just as 
Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and 
twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was 
allowed to fall, communist leaders would be emboldened to 
override nations closer to our own shores. 
                  —President Harry Truman (1956.)
forces into hostilities rather than allowing Congress to exercise its constitutional role of  
authorization. In seeking to justify the unilateral deployment of U.S. forces abroad, 
presidents in the modern era have usually done so under the auspices of international 
“authorization” via United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions or the support of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. It is worth noting however, that while 
presidents have argued legal authority from the U.N. or NATO agreements, such are 
unconstitutional, or at least extra-constitutional, according to the Constitution’s 
provisions on self-government (Fisher, Pres. Wars). According to the Constitution, the 
Senate may not transfer the powers vested to Congress through Article I to any regional 
or international organization via the treaty process (Fisher, Pres. Wars). In Medellin v. 
Texas (2008), the Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of authority from the 
Constitution or Congress, the president is unable to enforce international treaties (Oyez). 
 Presidential requests to Congress for the authority to use military force since 
1942, when granted, usually have authorized broad military authority to use the Nation’s 
military forces throughout entire regions, to defend U.S. interests in accordance with the 
president’s own discretion. This contrasts with traditional congressional authorizations as 
practiced by the Founders themselves, which granted the president narrow authority to 
use the Nation’s military forces solely in pursuance of the scope of Congress. The 
authority granted to the president through modern congressional authorizations closely 
resembles that of formal declarations of war, where the president is granted enormous 
latitude to conduct military operations across the globe according to his own discretion. 
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 As presidents have gained such powers, they have differed in the way it was 
exercised. From 1942 to 2001, as presidential power war power increased, the Nation was 
repeatedly thrust into unconstitutional military conflicts to defend United States interests 
and foreign states against the spread of communism and ideals contrary to those of the 
Nation. In doing so, Presidents have argued to tried to hide the true nature of their actions 
to Congress and the American people. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 to the present day, presidents have largely Congress in authorizing the use of the 
Nation’s military forces, and have instead used unilateral action to introduce U.S. forces 
into various conflicts across the globe. In the case of both periods of the expanse of 
presidential war powers, presidents have either claimed authorization to do so on the 
basis of executive constitutional authority, prior broad congressional authorization, 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions, or NATO allies. 
A. 1942-2001 
 Since 1942, presidents have sought to expand the war powers of the presidency at 
the expense of the Founders’ intentions. The inauguration of the present presidential 
campaign to increase the war powers of the presidency appropriately follows the Nation’s 
final formal declaration of war against Rumania.  
 As President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the last president to receive a declaration 
of war from Congress, his actions did not result in the expanded presidential power over 
the initiation of hostilities. Rather, as demonstrated through the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Ex Parte Quirin (1942) and Korematsu v. United States (1944), Roosevelt expanded 
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presidential war powers through his unprecedented execution of such congressional 
authorizations. In Quirin, despite Congress’s role in determining who gets access to what 
courts per the Constitution, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Roosevelt’s order to 
establish a trial by military commission for eight German conspirators captured following 
a failed attempt to sabotage various targets within the United States (Justia). The Court 
ruled the as the German conspirators were captured as spies without uniform with the 
intent to sabotage, they had violated the laws of war and thus were unlawful enemy 
combatants (Justia). As Congress had authorized such military commissions to try 
unlawful enemy combatants through the Articles of War, the Court ruled that the 
president had the power to order such  commissions through the execution of such 
articles as commander in chief (Justia). Following the Supreme Court’s cementing of 
executive power in Quirin, the proper limit of presidential authority following a 
declaration of war was increasingly unclear. Two years later, the Supreme Court set the 
limits of presidential authority through its decision in Korematsu. Following the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 
19, 1942 (George Mason University). Citing the authority vested in him as President of 
the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Roosevelt’s Order 
authorized the exclusion of Americans from certain areas of the United States as deemed 
appropriate by the War Department (Oyez). Soon after, the Army’s Western Defense 
Command, charged with overseeing the defense of the West Coast of the United States, 
used Roosevelts order to force the relocation of tens of thousands Americans, chiefly of 
Japanese descent, to internment camps (George Mason University). In Korematsu, the 
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Supreme Court upheld Roosevelt’s controversial Order in a 6-3 decision and confirmed 
the executive authority to relocate American citizens in a state of war (Oyez). Through 
Quirin and Korematsu, the Supreme Court affirmed Roosevelt’s broad execution of 
executive authority during wartime, which consequently enabled his successors the 
ability to build on his expansion of presidential powers. 
 While Roosevelt set the stage for the expansion of presidential war powers, it 
would ultimately be his successor, who would catalyze it. Upon Roosevelt’s death in 
office in 1945, Vice President Harry Truman was handed the reigns to an emboldened 
presidency. In the months to follow, President Truman led the United States military 
forces to victory in Europe, and ultimately forced a defiant Imperial Japan into 
submission through the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The power vacuum 
which resulted from the collapse of Nazi Germany in Europe and Imperial Japan in Asia 
ushered in a new enemy for the United States, the Soviet Union and communism. Newly 
strengthened militarily and politically, the Soviet Union and the United States both saw 
the economic and political policies of the other as a threat to their own interests. By 1946, 
as communism began to rapidly spread throughout Europe and Asia, President Truman 
believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and began to formulate policies 
for the containment of the “communist threat” (Nelson 120). The next year, Truman 
ushered in a new American foreign policy of containing the geopolitical spread of 
communism and the Soviet threat in what would later be known as the Truman Doctrine. 
The Truman Doctrine pledged that the United States would provide “political, military 
and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal 
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authoritarian forces,” and thus ushered in the Cold War with the Soviet Union 
(Department of State). Truman’s pledge marked a stark departure from the American 
norm of remaining neutral and isolated from foreign conflicts not directly affecting the 
United States, to one of interventionism in the world’s affairs (Department of State).  
 In 1950, Truman implemented his policy of American military interventionism by 
unilaterally taking the Nation to war against North Korea in the Korean War (1950-1953). 
Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korean communist forces, Truman 
abandoned the presidential practice of seeking statutory authorization from Congress 
established by the Founders prior to taking military action. On June 26, 1950, Truman 
announced that the United Nations Security Council had ordered North Korea to 
withdraw its military forces from South Korea. The next day, stating that North Korea 
had failed to comply with the withdrawal order, Truman announced that he had ordered 
U.S. naval and air forces to provide South Korea with support (Fisher, Pres. Wars). In his 
June 27th announcement, Truman implied that the Soviet Union was behind the North 
Korean invasion, and that his behavior was commensurate under the authority granted to 
him by the United Nations (Nelson 123). In actuality, however, Truman’s actions were in 
direct violation of the U.N. Participation Act, which he signed into law with no 
objections in December of 1945 (Fisher, Pres. Wars). According to the Act, any U.N. 
agreements for the use of military force “shall be subject to the approval of the Congress 
by appropriate Act or joint resolution” (Fisher, Pres. Wars). 
 Not only did Truman progress presidential war powers regarding the initiation of 
hostilities, he deliberately went to great lengths to deceive Congress and the American 
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public as to the true nature of his actions. When asked if the Nation was at war during a 
press conference on June 29, 1950, Truman remarked “We are not at war,” but equated 
the use of U.S. forces to “a police action under the United Nations” (Fisher, Libya and 
War 2). In a Senate hearing over the Korean conflict the following June, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson admitted that in the usual sense of the word there is a war” in Korea 
(Fisher, Libya and War 2). Subsequently, in 1953, a federal district court remarked that in 
the eyes of a majority of the American public, there was little doubt that “the conflict now 
raging in Korea can be anything but war” (Fisher, Libya and War 2). Truman’s practice of 
playing games with his words to hide the true nature of his military actions from 
Congress and the public subsequently became a tradition of the office itself. 
 It is important to note that while President Truman sought to push presidential war 
power to indefinite bounds in the absence of meaningful congressional opposition, the 
federal judiciary did not allow all of Truman’s abuses to go unchecked. In the midst of 
the Korean War in April of 1952, American steel workers threatened to go on strike for 
higher wages against the steel companies of the United States (Justia). As steel was 
believed to be an essential part of the American war effort in Korea, President Truman 
issued an executive order commanding Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize 
control of the Nation’s steel mills (Justia). Sawyer subsequently directed the steel 
companies to comply with Truman’s order in accordance with governmental regulations. 
Just as in the case of initiating American military action within the Korean conflict, 
Truman failed to request prior approval from Congress. Rather, upon the issuance of his 
order, he informed Congress of his unilateral move to seize a major sect of American 
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industry (Law Library). Congress however, did nothing to impair Truman’s order (Law 
Library). When several steel companies led by Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company 
were granted a preliminary injunction by the U.S. District Court of Columbia barring 
Truman’s executive authority to seize and control the steel mills, the Supreme Court took 
up the case in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer (1952). In his defense, 
Truman cited prior presidential precedent and the executive authority vested to him as 
commander in chief and by Article II of the Constitution as appropriate grounds for his 
actions (C-Span). The Supreme Court, however, did not concur with Truman’s argument. 
In a landmark 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the institutional balance of power 
between the branches, ruling that nothing within the Constitution allowed the president to 
seize property during wartime without prior congressional statutory authorization (Justia). 
While prior rulings such as Milligan, Prize, Quirin, and Korematsu enabled expansive 
presidential powers in wartime, the Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown serves as a 
reminder that such powers are not without limitation. That limitation is Congress. 
 Nonetheless, successive presidents continued to follow Roosevelt and Truman’s 
seemingly unopposed example by pushing the limits of executive war power authority in 
the decades to follow. In response to a series of “provocative political and military 
actions” by the Chinese Communist government towards Formosa (Taiwan), President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a message to Congress on January 24, 1955 (Elsea and 
Weed 8). In his message, Eisenhower argued that the “serious danger” posed by 
communist aggression “to the security of our country,” the Pacific, could not wait for 
United Nations approval (Elsea and Weed 8). Rather, Eisenhower contended that the 
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circumstances necessitated military action to protect the interests of the United States by 
assuring the “security of Formosa and the Pescadores” (Elsea and Weed 8). While 
Eisenhower appealed to Congress to authorize the use of military force to “make clear the 
unified and serious intentions of our Government, our Congress and our people,” he 
contended that through his constitutional powers as commander in chief, he would not 
hesitate “to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us to protect the rights 
and security of the United States” in the absence of such approval (Elsea and Weed 8). 
Five days later, Congress passed legislation that authorized Eisenhower’s ambitions to 
use military force with no objections to his assertive right to initiate military operations 
through executive authority (Elsea and Weed 8). 
 Following in with the line with tradition of his predecessors, when President 
Lyndon B. Johnson assumed power in 1963, he brought his own presumptions of the 
presidential prerogative regarding war powers. According to Johnson, the president was 
to be the ultimate “decider” of the national government and the public, who were 
predisposed through the electoral process to grant the office full deference in matters of 
war (Nelson 127). Following a repulsed torpedo attack against the USS Maddox, a U.S. 
Navy destroyer, in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964, Johnson would quickly begin to 
personify that role (Elsea and Weed 9). Two days later, in the wake of spotty reports of 
additional attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson unilaterally ordered 
U.S. military aircraft to bomb North Vietnamese “gunboats and certain supporting 
facilities” which were believed to be in connection with the attacks on U.S. forces (Elsea 
and Weed 9). The next day, with no meaningful evidence regarding the supposed 
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“attacks” on U.S. forces by North Vietnamese forces, an enraged Johnson turned to 
Congress for their “opinion” on the matter (Nelson 128). In his appeal to Congress on 
August 5, 1961, Johnson deliberately used stealth and deception to push Congress 
towards authorizing military action through what would eventually be known as the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution (1964) (Elsea and Weed 10). According to the Gulf of Tonkin, a 
joint resolution enacted on August 10, 1964, Congress approved and supported “the 
determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to 
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further 
aggression” to “promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast 
Asia” (Elsea and Weed 10). By falling prey to Johnson’s emotional appeal, Congress fell 
into his trap by authorizing broad presidential war powers in the Vietnam War. Afforded 
with unprecedented broad authority to do so, in the two years following the enactment of 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson dispatched 200,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam in the 
absence of a formal declaration of war (Spector). Despite major efforts by the Johnson 
Administration to persuade the public and Congress that the war was being won, by 1968 
American forces were bogged down in their efforts to subdue the North Vietnamese 
communist threat (Spector). As more Americans were called into service and the 
casualties rose, the American public became increasingly disillusioned with the war effort 
in Vietnam (Spector). In the face of enormous public opposition to the Vietnam War, 
Johnson did not seek reelection in 1968 (Spector). 
 President Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, was elected largely on the his 
campaign promise to end the war and bring American forces home (Nelson 130-131). By 
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May of 1969, President Nixon began announcing his plans to begin the withdraw of the 
nearly half a million U.S. military personnel stationed in Vietnam and his ongoing 
success for peace in the region (Zeisberg 181). Nonetheless, such promises of withdrawal 
and peace to Congress and the public were marred with lies and deception, for Nixon had 
already succumbed to the tradition of his predecessors (Zeisberg 146). Two months prior, 
Nixon had unilaterally expanded America’s role in the conflict by beginning unauthorized 
military operations in Vietnam’s western neighbor, Cambodia. Despite being officially 
neutral in the conflict, Nixon believed the Cambodian government had been covertly 
operating as a conduit for the communist war effort against the United States and began a 
secret bombing campaign throughout Cambodia in March of 1969 (Zeisberg 146-147).  
 As America’s role in the Vietnam War continuously swelled under Nixon, 
Congress finally began to fight back against its own passivity towards presidential 
expansion of war powers and the expansion of the conflict. Upon a reexamination of the 
circumstances pertaining to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee argued that Congress had not meant to accommodate such a war through its 
authorization, but had only granted such broad presidential authorization as a means of 
preventing the war itself (Nelson 131). According to the report, Congress had made an 
erroneous personal judgment as to how the President would execute the resolution, when 
it should have been making an institutional judgement “as to what any President would 
do with so great an acknowledgment of power, and, (…) as to whether, under the 
Constitution, Congress had a right to grant or concede the authority in question” (Rotter 
77).    
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 In light of the report and increased public pressure, Congress began to take action 
to inhibit the presidency from expanding the Nation’s military involvement in the region 
through its constitutional power over appropriations. In December of 1969, Congress 
moved to reassert their constitutional powers over war by amending a defense bill to deny 
the necessary funding to prohibit the use of U.S. ground forces in neighboring Laos and 
Thailand (Zelizer). Despite Congress’ move to restrict further U.S. involvement in the 
region, Nixon continued his campaign against neutral Cambodia. Relying on the broad 
authorities of the commander in chief clause established by his predecessors, Nixon 
announced the American public on April 30, 1970 that U.S. ground forces had crossed the 
Cambodian border to destroy North Vietnamese communist refuges and forces in the 
country (Zelizer). In response to Nixon’s blatant disregard of public and congressional 
sentiments, Congress extended their previous amendment in June to prohibit funding 
necessary for U.S. ground force operations in Cambodia (Zelizer).  
 Despite repeated objections from the Nixon administration that such actions 
would inhibit his “lawful responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces,” 
Congress continued reasserting its constitutional powers over war (Zelizer). In 1971, 
Congress passed the Defense Procurement Authorization Act, which declared that the 
United States intended “to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations 
of the United States in Indochina” (Nelson). While Nixon would eventually sign these 
congressional actions into law, he continued to warn that such were dangerous 
encroachments on his “lawful responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces” 
(Zelizer). Through signing statements, Nixon stated that these encroachments were 
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without “binding force or effect” and would have no effect on the pursuance of the 
policies which he had enacted as commander in chief (Nelson). 
 While Nixon’s predecessors were able to wield the Nation’s military forces with 
seemingly no meaningful opposition to their assertive right, as demonstrated by the acts 
of Congress to limit the expansion of U.S. forces in the surrounding regions of Vietnam 
through 1969-1971, it took a vastly unpopular war to finally push Congress to reassert 
their own traditions. After much debate and deliberations on the matter, in 1973 Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) in an effort to limit presidential war powers 
(Fisher, Pres. Wars). Nixon promptly vetoed the Resolution as “an encroachment upon his 
constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief” (Fisher, Uncons. Pres. Wars 21). 
Nixon’s veto was nonetheless immediately overridden in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate (Nelson). According to the War Powers Resolution of 
1973, the president is obligated to notify Congress within forty-eight hours of ordering 
the Nation’s armed forces into action. In the absence of a formal declaration of war or 
other statutory authorization from Congress, the bill prohibits the Nation’s armed forces 
from remaining deployed for more than sixty days (Yale). On top of the sixty day 
deployment window, the bill also permits an additional thirty days for withdrawing 
American forces (Yale). In total, the Resolution allows for the deployment of the Nation’s 
military forces for a ninety day duration. According to Section 2 of the WPR, the purpose 
of the Resolution is to:  
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fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and 
insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances. (Yale) 
 While the War Powers Resolution seeks to fulfill the intent of the Framers 
according to its stated purpose, a historical investigation into its usage demonstrates that 
it has failed to do so (Table 3). Since its enactment, the assertive nature in which 
presidents have committed the Nation’s military forces into action has steadily increased 
rather than decreased (Schonberg 134). In comparison with the Constitution, the WPR 
grants the president far greater unilateral authority over war powers, specifically through 
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the president’s ability to deploy American forces for up to ninety days without 
congressional authorization. Thus, the president is essentially enabled to wage war 
unilaterally, in a fashion more reflective of the British monarch than the Founders’ 
intentions. Initially, according to Section 5(c) of the Resolution, Congress could negate 
unilateral expansionism by permitting Congress to end military action at any point by 
majority-vote through a concurrent resolution of Congress (Yale). Following the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, however, the 
president could veto any such resolution from Congress, which thus required a veto-proof 
congressional majority to end military action (Kosar).  
 In addition, the “collective judgement” sought by the Resolution has been 
repeatedly impeded by questions regarding its constitutionality. Since its enactment in 
1973, no president has ever formally acknowledged the War Powers Resolution’s 
constitutionality (Carter). Rather, each president has taken the position of President 
Nixon, that the Resolution is in direct violation of Article V of the Constitution, as the 
only way to properly alter the constitutional powers of the executive and legislative 
branches is through amendments to the Constitution itself (Cornell). In accordance with 
the belief that the WPR is not legally binding, most every president has simply ignored 
citing the Resolution’s Section 4(a)(1) provision to Congress when introducing American 
military forces into action, which effectively begins the ninety day clock for deployment 
(Nelson). In reality, only one president has reported military action to Congress under the 
Section 4(a)(1) provision, President Gerald Ford. In 1975, President Ford reported to 
Congress that he had ordered military operations against the Khmer Rouge, in retaliation 
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for their illegal seizure of the SS Mayaguez, a United States merchant vessel (Nelson). By 
the time Ford had reported the military action however, the operation was already 
completed (Nelson).  
 While Ford had complied with the WPR, President Ronald Reagan’s term in 
office would reignite presidential war powers expansionism. In July of 1982, President 
Reagan announced that he would be sending U.S. forces to Lebanon as part of a 
multinational peacekeeping operation permitted by the Lebanese government (Elsea and 
Weed 10). When Reagan introduced U.S. Marines to Lebanon on August 25, 1982, he 
reported to Congress military action, but did not cite Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, but the 
prior agreement with the Lebanese government which did not stipulate combat operations 
(Elsea and Weed 10). Following the departure of the fist dispatch of U.S. Marines from 
Lebanon on September 10th, Reagan sent an additional dispatch of Marines to the 
country ten days later. In a message to Congress on September 29, Reagan announced the 
second dispatch of U.S. Marines, but yet again did not cite Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, 
stating that their presence was not due to a combat role (Elsea and Weed 10). As U.S. 
Marines began to be killed or wounded as a result of the deployment order in Lebanon, 
Reagan continuously failed to cite Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR to Congress. Believing 
that such hostilities were not directed at American forces, Reagan insisted to Congress 
that his actions were “consistent with” the provisions of the WPR (Rubner 637). As 
tensions began to rise over the deployment, Reagan agreed to compromise with Congress 
through the enactment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution on October 12, 
1983 (Elsea and Weed 11). The Lebanon Resolution invoked Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR 
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and authorized U.S. Marines to remain in country for 18 additional months (Elsea and 
Weed 11). In a signing statement on the bill however, Reagan iterated “that I do not and 
cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the Constitution as President and as 
Commander in Chief of United States Armed Forces,” and that his signature did not 
acknowledge that his “constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by 
statute” (Elsea and Weed 11).  
 Two weeks later, under the support of a multinational coalition of Caribbean 
states, Reagan ordered 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine personnel to invade Grenada on 
October 25, 1983 (Rubner 637). In a letter to Congress that afternoon, Reagan reported 
the action as “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” (Rubner 637). While he 
reported the action to Congress, just as in the case of Lebanon, Reagan deliberately chose 
to play word games with Congress over the true nature of his actions. In his report to 
Congress, he did not acknowledge that his reporting of the action was in pursuance of the 
WPR, nor did he explicitly convey that U.S. forces in Grenada were being introduced to 
hostilities (Rubner 637-638). Reagan knew that in the absence of congressional 
authorization, had Congress been notified of the prior, he would have automatically 
triggered the Resolution’s Section 4(a)(1) sixty day requirement for the termination of 
military action in Grenada. While Congress subsequently scrambled to enact legislation 
which statutorily proclaimed Reagan’s message to initiate the sixty day timeline, all 
attempts were in vain (Rubner 638-640). Nonetheless, Reagan’s military initiative in 
Grenada was completed in less than sixty days (Fisher, Pres. Wars from Truman 21). 
Reagan would again play games with Congress through his bombing of Libya in 1986. In 
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his message reporting to Congress, Reagan yet again maintained that his actions were 
“consistent with War Powers Resolution” (Fisher, Pres. Wars from Truman 21), and 
further stated that: 
These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter… These self-defense measures were 
undertaken pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my 
authority as Commander in Chief… (Burgin 222) 
 It is important to note that while Reagan was able to openly avoid the 
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, as touched on earlier, there was indeed 
pushback from Congress. In every instance, members of Congress took action to voice 
their disdain for the unilateral expanse of presidential war powers under undertaken in 
spite of the intentions of the WPR. These congressional actions included: introducing 
reactive legislation concentrated on executive interpretation of and execution of the 
Resolution, introducing preemptive legislation aimed at disabling the executive’s ability 
to bypass the Resolution’s requirements, floor hearings and statements responding to 
presidential action, and letters to Reagan himself (Burgin 225-230). Although far less 
common than the previous congressional actions, in several instances groups of 
legislators tried to force Reagan into complying with the WPR through direct lawsuits: 
Crockett v. Reagan (1982), Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan (1983), Conyers v. Reagan 
(1984) and Lowry v. Reagan (1987). While these cases dealt mostly with procedural 
questions and congressional prerogatives, each case was dismissed by the courts on the 
grounds of the political question doctrine or the doctrine of equitable discretion (Burgin 
231). While examples of congressional action against Reagan’s post-WPR use of the 
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Nation’s armed forces exist, none were able to meaningfully oppose the President’s 
ability to unilaterally wield the Nation’s military. 
 Under President George H.W. Bush, the Nation’s military would yet again be 
thrust into conflict following unilateral action. In what was the largest deployment of 
U.S. forces since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, under the 
direction of President H.W. Bush, U.S. forces invaded Panama and attacked Panamanian 
defense forces on December 20, 1989 (Burgin 232). While H.W. Bush decided to order 
the attack days prior, no effort had been made to consult congressional opinions on the 
matter (Burgin 232-233). Rather, in the hours before the invasion commenced, the 
executive simply informed leaders in Congress of the incursion to come (Burgin 233). 
While he would eventually send a report to Congress, H.W. Bush did so in the traditional 
fashion of his predecessors, by stating that his report was “consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution” (Burgin 233). Additionally, H.W. Bush disregarded the Resolution’s 
requirement to inform Congress of military action within forty-eight hours by filing the 
report days after the invasion began (Burgin 233). Unlike Reagan’s previous use of 
military action which failed to abide by the War Powers Resolution, H.W. Bush’s 
invasion of Panama was met with seemingly no public opposition from Congress (Burgin 
233-234). Nonetheless, H.W. Bush’s military initiative in Panama was subsequently 
completed within sixty days (Fisher, Uncons. Pres. Wars 21). 
 A year later in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under the direction of 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, President H.W. Bush yet again took unilateral action. A 
week after the Iraqi invasion, H.W. Bush unilaterally deployed U.S. forces to the Saudi 
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Arabia to prevent further acts of Iraqi aggression in the region (Elsea and Weed 12). 
Noting that he did not believe the possibility of hostilities were imminent in his report to 
Congress, he yet again repeated that such action was “consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 12). By the end of 1990, there were over 350,000 U.S. 
military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (Elsea and Weed 12). With the 
probability of war in the absence of congressional authorization growing, fifty-three 
members of Congress brought suit against the President for his failure to seek the prior 
consultation of Congress in Dellums v. Bush (1990) (Shonberg 137). Before the U.S. 
District Court of Columbia, the U.S. Justice Department argued in Dellums that the 
president had the authority to take offensive actions against Iraq without the prior consent 
of Congress (Fisher ). In its decision however, the court found no credit to the Justice 
Department’s argument, stating that if the president:  
had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, 
no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive 
military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a 
semantic decision by the Executive. Such an “interpretation” would evade the 
plain meaning of the Constitution, and it cannot stand. (Fisher) 
In a similar fashion to the congressional lawsuits examined during the Reagan-era, the 
case was nonetheless dismissed by the court. Specifically, the case was dismissed on 
grounds that the “Court would not be a surrogate for Congress, or a fallback for 
legislators whose views were not shared by a majority of both houses” (Shonberg 137).  
 On November 29, 1990, the United Nations authorized member states to 
implement various U.N. Resolutions seeking to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait by all 
means necessary (Elsea and Weed 12). Using the United Nation’s authorization to gain 
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support, by January 1991, President H.W. bush had secured the support of an 
international coalition to rid Kuwait of its Iraqi problem (Elsea and Weed 12). Armed 
with international support, H.W. Bush sent a letter to Congress requesting a supporting 
resolution to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces “to protect America’s security” in 
pursuance of the United Nations Resolutions (Elsea and Weed 13). Within his message, 
H.W. Bush notably did not ask for the authorization of Congress, but its support. Days 
later in a televised interview, H.W. Bush reasserted his claim that in the absence of a 
congressional authorization, he had the constitutional “authority to fully implement the 
United Nations resolutions” (Elsea and Weed 13). 
 In the wake of this assertion of unilateral presidential authority, Congress 
nonetheless passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution,” to pursue the U.N. Resolutions on January 12, 1991 (Elsea and Weed 13). 
Within the joint resolution however, Congress listed several stipulations towards H.W. 
Bush’s potential use of military force. According to Section 2(b) of the Resolution, the 
president was to inform Congress of all diplomatic efforts, past and present, undertaken 
by the United States to ensure Iraqi compliance as a precondition to the use of the 
Nation’s military forces. If it was clear to Congress that the United States had exhausted 
all diplomatic means to ensure compliance, the president would then be enabled to 
execute the “specific statutory authority” of the Resolution according to “the meaning of 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 13). Following the 
initiation of military action, the president would then be required to report to Congress 
every 60 days on ongoing efforts to ensure Iraqi compliance (Elsea and Weed 13). While 
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H.W. Bush would sign the Resolution into law and commence operations against Iraq, he 
would yet advance the presidential tradition of disregarding the role of Congress in the 
process, as demonstrated through his signing statement: 
my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does 
not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch 
on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to 
defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. 
(Elsea and Weed 13)
 Following George H.W. Bush, President Bill Clinton yet again underscored the 
erosion of the Founders’ intentions of war powers. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Clinton would be the first president since Roosevelt not directly threatened by the 
Cold War and the geopolitical spread of communism. With the Soviet threat in the rear-
view mirror, an emboldened United States was now ready to assume the role of the 
world’s sole hegemonic power under Clinton. Although Clinton had campaigned against 
H.W. Bush’s war policies, he would soon find himself emulating and expanding on the 
practice as a harbinger of his predecessors (Yarhi-Milo 227-228). 
 When Clinton was inaugurated in 1993, he inherited H.W. Bush’s military 
initiatives in Iraq and Somalia. In both countries, Clinton would unilaterally escalate U.S. 
diplomatic tensions through the use of force without congressional authorization. In June 
of 1993, President Clinton unilaterally ordered the launching of twenty-three tomahawk 
cruise-missiles against Iraq’s intelligence command center in Baghdad in retaliation for a 
failed assassination attempt against H.W. Bush in Kuwait (Adler 159). As for the 
authority to ignore Congress and unilaterally order the strike, Clinton cited his 
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commander in chief power and his “constitutional authority” to conduct U.S. foreign 
policy (Adler 160).  
 In Somalia, Clinton would yet again escalate tensions and put American forces at 
risk without the consent of Congress. Following his defeat in the presidential election in 
1992, in a final act as commander in chief, H.W. Bush sent U.S. forces abroad to pursue a 
U.N. humanitarian effort in Somalia known as “Operation Restore Hope” in December, 
1992 (Klarevas 523). Following the deaths of twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers in 
Somalia, Clinton shifted from the nature of the U.S. mission from peaceful means to 
military action against the self-proclaimed president of Somalia, Mohamed Farrah Aidid 
(Yarhi-Milo 230). On October 3rd, Clinton ordered a raid to capture several of Aidid’s 
top aids in what would be known as the Battle of Mogadishu, or “Black Hawk 
Down” (Yarhi-Milo 231). In ordering the retaliatory attack on Aidid’s forces, Clinton 
nonetheless offered no legal or constitutional justification (Adler 160). The raid 
ultimately resulted the deaths of eighteen U.S. servicemen in disaster (Yarhi-Milo 231). 
Enraged, following the incident members of Congress began calling for the immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia (Yarhi-Milo 231). Clinton resisted congressional 
opposition to the enormously unpopular mission, and nonetheless built up U.S. forces in 
Somalia in the months to follow (Yarhi-Milo 231).  
 Following the disaster in Somalia, Clinton became an indicator of presidential 
practice to come through his adaptation to the changing nature of warfare. Rather than 
directly place U.S. lives at risk through boots on the ground and face the potential 
political costs of doing so, Clinton began extensively using long-range bombing and 
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tomahawk cruise-missile strikes to further the office’s grasp over war powers throughout 
his presidency. Here are four such examples: 
1. 1994 and 1995: Clinton implemented this strategy of indirect warfare through his 
bombing campaign of targets throughout Bosnia. All the while Clinton ordered the 
bombings, he never once sought the prior authorization of Congress to do so. Rather, 
Clinton yet again cited his “constitutional authority” as commander in chief and prior 
“authorization” from U.N. resolutions and NATO allies as the means to do so (Adler 
160-161). 
2. September 3, 1996: Following an Iraqi military offensive against Kurdish city of Irbil 
in northern Iraq, Clinton unilaterally ordered a tomahawk cruise-missile strike on 
various Iraqi military targets in southern Iraq (Fisher, Against Iraq). According to 
Clinton, the missile strike— which coincided with his 1996 reelection campaign— 
was authorized by prior U.N. resolutions on Iraq (Fisher, Against Iraq).  
3. On August 20, 1998: Clinton yet again took unilateral action by ordering tomahawk 
cruise-missile strikes on suspected al-Qaeda terrorist sanctuaries within Afghanistan 
and Sudan. Following these missile strikes, Clinton chose yet again to offer no 
constitutional justification for his unilateral acts of war-making abroad (Adler 
161-162).  
4. December 16-19, 1998: Following the failure of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to 
comply with a prior agreement to grant U.N. inspectors broad authority to investigate 
various Iraqi instillations suspected to house weapons of mass destruction, Clinton 
unilaterally ordered an extensive bombing campaign throughout the country—in the 
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midst of his impeachment trial. In defense of his unilateral order, Clinton asserted that 
Iraq had failed to comply with U.N. weapons inspectors, and that the missile strikes 
were coordinated to “attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
programs” (Adler 162).  
 While President Clinton’s actions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and 
Sudan all point to his disregard for the Founders’ intentions and congressional authority, 
the bombing campaign of Yugoslavia serves as Clinton’s defining assertion of unilateral 
power. On March 24, 1999, in conjunction with eighteen NATO allies, the United States 
began a bombing campaign throughout Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war (Adler 163). 
Unlike the 1994 and 1995 bombing campaigns of Bosnia which were also carried out by 
the U.S. and NATO allies, the United Nations Security Council explicitly failed to 
endorse military action in Yugoslavia prior to the operation and thus failed to deliver 
perceived additional “authority” to Clinton (Fisher, Basic Principles 334). In ordering the 
attack which constituted the largest deployment of U.S. airpower since the Vietnam War, 
Clinton yet again deferred to his “constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief” and 
did not seek prior congressional authorization to use the Nation’s military forces (Adler, 
163). When Clinton first informed Congress of his order to bomb Yugoslavia on March 
26, 1999, he unsurprisingly reported to Congress that the unilateral action was “consistent 
with the War Powers Resolution” (Damrosch 137). Unlike prior instances in which 
presidents unilaterally engaged in acts of warfare, however, Clinton’s campaign in 
Yugoslavia was the first instance in American history in which a president waged war in 
the face of direct congressional refusal to authorize a war (Adler 156). A month following 
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Clinton’s order in April, the House of Representatives defeated a joint resolution 
declaring a state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Adler 163). Most notably however, is the fate of a congressional measure to 
authorize the president to U.S. air forces and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. While it 
was passed by the Senate, by a tie vote of 213-213, it failed to pass through the House of 
Representatives (Adler 163). According to the Constitution and historical practice, 
congressional authorizations required the approval of both chambers of the legislature for 
the president to be authorized to use military force. By its failure to pass the House of 
Representatives, Congress had refused to authorize Clinton’s military air campaign in 
Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, Clinton continued to wage his war. 
 In an effort to reassert the role of Congress in authorizing the use of military 
force, in Campbell v. Clinton (1999) numerous members of Congress filed suit against 
the President on claims that his military actions in Yugoslavia violated the Constitution 
and the War Powers Resolution (Damrosch 138). Falling in line with the precedent of 
presidential practice, the Clinton Administration argued that the members of Congress 
lacked standing to sue on constitutional or statutory claims, the issues lacked ripeness, 
and that the cased should be dismissed under the political question doctrine (Damrosch 
138). Additionally, the Clinton Administration argued that congressional funding was 
implicit authorization for the use of military force, despite the War Powers Resolution 
explicitly stating otherwise (Damrosch 138). In reaching its decision, the U.S. District 
Court of Columbia held in Campbell that this was a political question on which lacked 
justiciability, thus offering no judicial remedy to Clinton’s extraconstitutional actions. 
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 As demonstrated through this section, beginning with Roosevelt and Truman, the 
institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers deviated far from the Founders’ 
intentions throughout the twentieth century. Following the enactment of the Truman 
Doctrine in 1947, the American tradition of isolation was renounced for a new path of 
global interventionism to negate the spread of the Soviet threat and communism. In 
Vietnam, Presidents Johnson and Nixon infamously seized on the broad authority granted 
by Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and vastly expanded America’s role 
in the unpopular conflict according to their “constitutional authority” as commander in 
chief. In 1973, Congress tried to vindicate itself from the Vietnam debacle and prevent 
further expansion of presidential war powers through the War Powers Resolution. In spite 
of congressional ambitions, however, presidents increasingly asserted broad independent 
authority to deploy U.S. forces under the auspice of prior U.N., NATO “authority,” or 
their inherent constitutional authority. Following the collapse of the Soviet threat and the 
end of the Cold War in 1991, presidential use of the Nation’s military forces remained 
essential in maintaining the global hegemonic role of the United States. As the nature of 
warfare changed through technological and political developments, by the mid-1990s 
America’s mandate was increasingly cemented through foreign bombing campaigns and 
cruise-missile strikes under the unilateral order of President Bill Clinton. When faced 
with these increasingly broad assertions of presidential war power throughout the 
twentieth century, Congress commonly appeased the president or failed to mount a 
meaningful legal challenge, or political one (i.e., impeachment) in response. 
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B. 2001-Present 
 Shortly after assuming the presidency in January of 2001, newly-inaugurated 
President George W. Bush would soon be required to exercise the role of commander in 
chief and lead the Nation’s military forces. On September 11, 2001, a series of 
coordinated terrorist attacks on the United States destroyed the World Trade Center, 
significantly damaged the Pentagon and claimed nearly three-thousand lives (Schonberg 
116). In response to the most-deadly attack on U.S. soil since the Japanese bombing of 
Pearl Harbor in 1941, President George W. Bush proclaimed that the United States would 
use “all resources to conquer” the enemy responsible for these “acts of war” against 
“freedom and democracy” (Elsea and Weed 14). Within days following the attack, 
Congress was ready to grant George W. Bush the resources he desired by joint resolution. 
On the morning of September 14, the Senate passed S.J. Res. 23, entitled the 
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” against terror (AUMF), by unanimous 98-0 
vote (Elsea and Weed 14). That afternoon, the House of Representatives also passed S.J. 
Res. 23 by a vote of 420-1, after rejecting a motion that would require the President to 
report his actions to Congress every sixty days pursuant to the authorization (Elsea and 
Weed 14). The only dissenting vote within the House on S.J. Res. 23 came from 
Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA), who believed that the resolution would serve as a 
blank check for the expansion of presidential war powers (Shonberg 118). Section 2 of 
S.J. Res. 23 outlines the scope of the authorization within two brief subsections. 
According to section 2(a) of S.J. Res. 23, the President is authorized to: 
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use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. (Shonberg 116) 
The following subsection of S.J. Res. 23 section 2(b) outlines the authorization's War 
Powers Resolution requirements. According to section 2(b)(1), Congress declares that the 
resolution "is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Additionally, section 2(b)(2) declares that 
"Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
Resolution" (Elsea and Weed 15). On September 18, 2001, President George W. Bush 
signed S.J. Res. 23 into law (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note). When signing the 2001 
AUMF into law, in line with presidential tradition W. Bush stated that "in signing this 
resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the 
President's constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United 
States, and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution" (Elsea and 
Weed 15).  
 Following his signature, President George W. Bush was quick to implement the 
broad authority granted to him and began deploying U.S. forces. By September 24, W. 
Bush notified Congress regarding the first deployment of U.S. forces into "a number of 
foreign nations" throughout the "Central and Pacific Command areas of 
operations" (Weed, Pres. References 4). On October 9, 2001, W. Bush notified Congress 
that "Operation Enduring Freedom" had commenced in Afghanistan and that major U.S. 
combat operations had commenced against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Weed, Pres. 
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References 4). Shortly after the United States' commencement of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces effectively defeated Taliban rule and 
established an interim Afghan government by December of 2001 (Stanley 104). Although 
the Taliban government was removed from power, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces remained 
through large sects of the country (Stanley 105). Throughout 2002, U.S. and coalition 
forces engaged in a series of major combat operations, which ultimately shattered the 
military abilities of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan (Stanley 105). On May 1, 
2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an effective end to U.S. major 
combat operations in Afghanistan (Stanley 105). U.S. forces remained in Afghanistan 
following Rumsfeld's announcement to "prevent a political and military resurgence of the 
Taliban" and al-Qaeda, oversee the implementation of the new government and to "train 
Afghan security forces" (Stanley 105). The security mission, however, would prove 
disastrous as the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces were able to reorganize along the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and begin insurgency operations against U.S. and coalition 
forces within months (Stanley 105). Despite numerous military offensives since the 
Taliban's resurgence in 2003, U.S. forces continue to remain in a state of perpetual 
warfare against the Taliban and other Islamic insurgent groups in Afghanistan under the 
authority of the 2001 AUMF (as of 2020). 
 The year following the invasion of Afghanistan, President George W. Bush began 
to reinforce the claims of his predecessor that despite being defeated by the United States 
in 1991, Iraq and its government continued to pose a serious threat to the interests and 
security of the United States (Elsea and Weed 16). Specifically, W. Bush maintained that 
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despite U.N. resolutions following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had failed to cease its 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs (Elsea and Weed 16). On September 
12, 2002, W. Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly and asserted that if Iraq 
continued to ignore its obligations, the United States would not hesitate to take action to 
enforce the U.N. resolutions (Elsea and Weed 16). Following W. Bush's U.N. speech, 
Congress began crafting legislation that would allow the president to take action against 
the supposed threat towards the United States. Meanwhile, the W. Bush Administration 
continued to further claims of an Iraqi threat, by connecting al-Qaeda terrorist operations 
with Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Regime (Fisher, Dec. on War 397-401). On the eve of an 
important House vote regarding authorization against Iraq, Bush reported to the Nation 
that Iraq had actively engaged in training members of al-Qaeda in "bomb making and 
poisons and deadly gasses" on October 7 (Fisher, Dec. on War 400). By October 11, 
2002, both the House of Representatives and the Senate had passed the "Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution" (H.J.Res. 114) and sent it to the White 
House for final approval (Elsea and Weed 17). According to section 3 of the Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, the President is authorized to use the 
Nation's military forces "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" to "defend the 
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" and to 
"enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Elsea 
and Weed 17). As a predicate to the president's use of force, the resolution stipulated 
periodic reports to Congress regarding ongoing operations and that the resolution was 
"intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) 
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of the War Powers Resolution" (Elsea and Weed 17). In signing the resolution into law on 
October 16, 2002, W. Bush yet again provided that the signing of such an authorization 
does not affect the "President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or 
respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the 
War Powers Resolution" (Elsea and Weed 17).  
 Beginning in March of 2003, U.S. and coalition forces invaded Iraq to topple 
Saddam Hussein's regime in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Council on Foreign Relations). In 
just over a month, by mid-April U.S. and coalition forces had removed Saddam Hussein 
from power and instituted a new provisional Iraqi government (Council on Foreign 
Relations). On May 1, 2003, before a crowd of U.S. Naval personnel aboard the USS 
Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared, "The battle of Iraq is one victory 
in a war on terror that began on September 11, 2001, and still goes on" (Bash). 
Nevertheless, the conflict in Iraq further escalated following initial claims of an American 
victory. Just as in the case of the American effort in Afghanistan, following initial victory, 
U.S. military forces became bogged down in a perpetual fight against radical Islamic 
insurgency groups in Iraq (Council on Foreign Relations). After more than seven years of 
war and 4,400 U.S. casualties in Iraq, President Barack Obama announced a formal end 
to United States combat operations in Iraq on August 10, 2010 (Council on Foreign 
Relations). In his address to the Nation, President Obama reinforced that despite the 
imminent withdraw of U.S. troops the following year, the United States would not 
abandon Iraq (Council on Foreign Relations). When the final U.S. forces left Iraq on 
December 18, 2011, the Iraq War official came to a close (Council on Foreign Relations). 
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In passing the 2001 AUMF against terror, Congress essentially afforded the presidency a 
blank check to wage indefinite warfare abroad. While the 2001 AUMF is sparse on 
details, it affords an unprecedented amount of broad military authority to the president in 
comparison with previous congressional authorizations by not only authorizing the 
president to "use all necessary and appropriate" military force against nations, but also 
against organizations and persons for an indefinite duration (Shonberg 116). According to 
the authorization, the president alone may determine the nations, organizations, and 
persons that "planned, authorized, committed, (…) aided" or "harbored" those responsible 
for the in the September 11, 2001 attacks (Shonberg 116). Additionally, the authorization 
enables the president to use military force to prevent future terrorist attacks against the 
United States by those in association with those who perpetrated the September 11, 2001 
attacks (Shonberg 116). While President George W. Bush was quick to name al-Qaeda 
and its members as the organization and persons responsible, as well as the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan as the nation responsible for harboring al-Qaeda and its 
members, these actors are nonetheless omitted from the language of the 2001 AUMF 
(Weed, Pres. References 4). 
 Since its passage in 2001, Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and 
Donald J. Trump have used the 2001 AUMF on terror to entrench the United States 
within a massive global "war on terror" and further the expansion of presidential war 
powers despite Congress and the Founders' institutional balance. Shortly after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, on November 13, 2001 George W. Bush issued a Military Order 
entitled the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
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Terrorism," which established that terrorist suspects would be detained and tried by 
military commissions (Weed, Pres. References 37). As a legal basis for his Order, W. 
Bush cited "the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the United States" and the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 37). 
Beginning in September of 2002, the W. Bush Administration began to expand U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan through the deployment of U.S. forces for 
military training, advising, and assisting (Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen), operations 
against al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), maritime interception operations on the 
high seas (Central and European Command Areas), and secure detention operations in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Weed, Pres. References 6). In each report to Congress from 
2002 to 2003, George W. Bush informed Congress that his actions were in accordance 
with his Article II authority and consistent with the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 
5). Additionally, the President stated that such reports to Congress were consistent with 
the War Powers Resolution (Weed, Pres. References 5).  
 In George W. Bush's reports to Congress from March of 2004 to December of 
2008, the President continued reporting additional deployments of U.S. forces throughout 
the globe. These notifications include additional deployments throughout Africa 
(including combat-equipped forces), launching both air and sea strikes against al-Qaeda 
targets in Somalia, deployments to enhance counterterrorism capabilities of "friends and 
allies," U.S. armed forces working with "friends and allies in areas around the globe," and 
the extension of maritime interception operations on the high seas throughout the globe 
(Weed, Pres. References 8-16) Throughout this span, W. Bush only briefly mentioned the 
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2001 AUMF once in reference to his reporting being "consistent with the 2001 AUMF 
and the WPR" (Weed, Pres. References 8). Beginning with the March 2004 notification, 
W. Bush began to list the operations against terror under a section entitled "The Global 
War on Terror," and that combat operations in Iraq "are a critical part of the war on 
terror…" but are nonetheless authorized under the 1991 and 2002 AUMF's against Iraq 
(Weed, Pres. References 8). In November of 2004, W. Bush began to characterize 
ongoing operations in Iraq within either the "Global War on Terrorism" or other anti-
terror labeled sections (Weed, Pres. References 8). 
 As demonstrated throughout the previous paragraphs, the George W. Bush 
Administration broadly interpreted the 2001 AUMF by unilaterally ordering the 
deployment of U.S. forces and combat operations globally. In addition, the W. Bush 
Administration invoked the 2001 AUMF to authorize military detentions of enemy 
combatants and U.S. citizens and residents, trials by military commission, and 
warrantless surveillance of communications "into and out of the United States of persons 
linked to al-Qaeda or related terrorist organizations" despite domestic law (Bradley 630). 
Throughout W. Bush's duration in office, his Administration's broad interpretation of 
Article II powers and the 2001 AUMF were constantly the subject of debate within the 
American public and Congress (Bradley 630).  
 Throughout his initial presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama took a 
hard-line against President George W. Bush's exercise of war powers. In 2007, when 
asked whether the president had the constitutional authority to take military action in the 
absence of an "imminent threat" without prior congressional authorization, Obama 
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replied "The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally 
authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or 
imminent threat to the nation" (Fisher, Libya Operations 177). Elaborating further, 
Obama stated that as commander in chief, the president: 
does have a duty to protect and defend the United States. In instances of self-
defense, the President would be within his constitutional authority to act before 
advising Congress or seeking its consent. History has shown us time and again, 
however, that military action is most successful when it is authorized and 
supported by the Legislative branch. It is always preferable to have informed 
consent of Congress prior to any military action. (Fisher, Libya Operations 177) 
Despite campaigning to do the opposite, upon assuming the presidency in 2009, President 
Barack Obama continued to expand on the practices of George W. Bush by increasing the 
U.S. military effort against terrorism. In March of 2009, The Obama Administration 
stated that its interpretation of the 2001 AUMF was “limited to the authority upon which 
the Government is relying to detain the persons now being held at Guantanamo Bay,” and 
that the 2001 AUMF was not “meant to define the authority for military operations 
generally, or detention in other contexts” (Bradley 635). Nevertheless, as his presidency 
progressed, Obama increasingly relied on 2001 AUMF authority. In his first two 
notifications to Congress in June and December of 2009, Obama maintained that anti-
terror deployments and combat operations were in accordance with his Article II 
authorities, and only cited the 2001 AUMF as the authority to continue detention 
operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Weed, Pres. References 8). From June 2010 to 
December 2011, Obama cited that his increase in anti-terror operations were “consistent 
with” the 2001 AUMF and the WPR, while continuing to cite detention operations solely 
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under the authority of the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 19). In addition to 
Guantanamo Bay, Obama expanded detention operations of “al-Qaeda, Taliban, and 
associated fighters” to Afghanistan beginning in June of 2011 under the 2001 AUMF 
(Weed, Pres. References 21). During his first few years in office, Obama also 
dramatically increased the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan from just over 30,000 in 
2008, to over 100,000 in 2011 under the 2001 AUMF (Kurtzleben).  
 While U.S. forces were in the process of withdrawing from Iraq in 2011, 
President Obama continued to escalate the U.S. war against terror in Afghanistan and 
across the globe. On March 19, 2011, Obama ordered direct U.S. military action in the 
Libyan Civil War (2011) against the ground forces and air defenses of Libyan Prime 
Minister Muammar al-Qaddafi without “seeking or obtaining” prior congressional 
authorization (Fisher, Libya 176-178). Following in the line of presidential tradition of 
unconstitutional war making, in his notice to Congress two days later on March 21, 
Obama informed Congress that U.S. military forces had commenced operations in Libya 
as “authorized by the United Nations Security Council” (Fisher, Libya Operations 179). 
Less than a week later, Obama stated in nationwide address that following the initial 
action of U.S. forces in Libya, he would “transfer responsibilities” to NATO allies and 
partners (Fisher, Libya Operations 179). The supposed “authorization” cited by Obama, 
U.N. Resolution 1973, called for U.N. member action “for the purposes of preparing a 
no-fly zone” over Libya (Fisher, Libya Operations 179). As the campaign progressed 
however, it was clear that Obama was not acting in accordance with his own supposed 
auspices of authorization. On April 25, Obama authorized the use of armed Predator 
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drones against al-Qaddafi forces (Fisher, Libya Operations 178). In a May 2011 letter to 
Congress, Obama appealed to Congress for congressional action supporting his Libya 
operations, stating that “even in limited actions such as this,” congressional support 
would “demonstrate a unity of purpose among the political branches on this important 
national security matter” (Fisher, Libya Operations 178). According to a Obama Justice 
Department opinion in 2011, in order for a military conflict to be constituted as a “war” 
U.S. military forces must be exposed to “prolonged and substantial military 
engagements,” under the threat of significant risk over a significant period” (Fisher, 
Libya Operations 180). Thus, according to the Obama Administration so long as U.S. 
casualties remained low in Libya, the military campaign could not be defined as a war 
(Fisher, Libya Operations 180).  
 While the Obama Administration maintained risk as a component which 
necessitates congressional authorization, the War Powers Resolution states otherwise. As 
previously mentioned, Section 4(a) of the WPR requires the president to report to 
Congress within forty-eight hours whenever U.S. forces are introduced “into hostilities or 
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances,” or when U.S. forces enter “the territory, air space or waters of a foreign 
nation, while equipped for combat” (Yale). Additionally, according to Section 5(b) of the 
WPR, if the president has not submitted the required report or has not received 
congressional authorization within sixty days prior to the commencement of operations, 
the president must terminate “any use of United States Armed Forces” and withdrawal 
within thirty days (Yale). When the sixty day deadline for congressional authorization 
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passed on on May 20, U.S. forces nonetheless remained engaged in military operations 
(Fisher, Libya Operations 180). With the final withdrawal deadline of ninety days 
approaching, on June 3, 2011 the House of Representatives passed H.Res.292, which 
directed the President to submit a report within fourteen days providing his justification 
for not seeking congressional authorization, as well as the national security interests at 
risk interests in Libya (Fisher, Libya Operations 180). In a bipartisan effort on June 13, 
the House of Representatives passed additional legislation voting to block funding to U.S. 
military operations in Libya (Kim).  
 In response to mounting congressional pressure, on June 15, 2011, the Obama 
Administration submitted a report to Congress on its Libyan campaign (Fisher, Libya 
Operations 180). According to the report, “the President had the constitutional authority, 
as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, 
to direct such limited military operations abroad” in operations which did not constitute a 
war (Fisher, Libya Operations 180). Such operations, according to the Obama 
Administration were “consistent with the War Powers Resolution and did not under that 
law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are 
distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s sixty-day 
termination provision,” as:  
U.S. operations [in Libya] do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges 
of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground 
troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of 
escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors. (Fisher, Libya Operations 
180) 
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Following Obama's report to Congress, the House of Representatives rejected a joint 
resolution on June 24, 2011, which would have authorized military actions in Libya 
(Ghattas). Nonetheless, Obama continued to order U.S. forces to engage in illegal 
military operations in Libya. Despite claiming American victory in the conflict in August 
of 2011, Libya has continued to remain in a state of constant political and social disarray 
through a civil war (Thrall). Such is further demonstrated by the fact that five years 
following his initial order, the Obama Administration was still unilaterally dropping 
bombs within Libya in 2016 (Zenko and Wilson). 
 While the Iraq War came to a close in December of 2011, the 2002 AUMF against 
Iraq continued to remain in effect (Golan-Vilella 62). Just as the 2001 AUMF against 
terror, the Authorization for the use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 
also affords unprecedented broad military authority to the president. In comparison with 
the previous 1991 AUMF against Iraq, the granted authority of the 2002 AUMF is not 
explicitly limited to previous U.N. resolutions (Elsea and Weed 17). Instead, the 2002 
AUMF authority includes both prior U.N. resolutions on Iraq, and those passed until up 
until the mandated U.N. expiration date of December 31, 2008 (Elsea and Weed 17). 
Additionally, just as the 2001 AUMF the 2002 AUMF authorizes the president to use the 
Nation's military forces in pursuance of the resolution for an indefinite period. In early 
2014, the Obama Administration reported that "the Administration supports the repeal of 
the Iraq AUMF since it is no longer used for any U.S. Government activities" (Brandon-
Smith). Nonetheless, that the same year the Obama Administration used the 2002 AUMF 
against Iraq in secondary-conjunction with the 2001 AUMF to authorize a resurgence of 
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U.S. ground forces to Iraq in yet another instance of presidential expansionism of the war 
on terror (Brandon-Smith). 
 In the Summer of 2014, the Obama Administration began increasing deployments 
of U.S. forces to Iraq to fight against a new enemy, the Islamic State (IS), stating that 
such action was "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution and his constitutional 
authority (Weed, Pres. References 28). After the initial destruction of al-Qaeda in the 
latter stages of the Iraq War, the Islamic State descended from al-Qaeda's ashes as an 
"associated force" following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 (Bradley 
637). The Obama Administration concluded that the 2001 AUMF authorized hostilities 
against the Islamic State because the group had a "direct relationship" with al-Qaeda's 
leader, Osama Bin Laden, and while he was alive had waged conflict "in allegiance to 
him" against the United States (Bradley 637). By 2014 however, the Islamic State had 
disassociated itself from al-Qaeda and began competing with the group for power 
throughout the globe (Bradley 637). 
 In August of 2014, Obama informed Congress of the initiation of "limited 
airstrikes" against Islamic State targets, by again referencing the reporting requirements 
of the WPR but had yet to cite any supporting authorization through the 2001 AUMF or 
the 2002 AUMF. The following month, President Obama addressed the Nation on 
September 10, 2014, discussing his intent to further engage the Islamic State through a 
"long-term series of airstrikes, new deployments, and other military actions" (Weed, Pres. 
References 28). On September 23, 2014, the Obama Administration reported to Congress 
regarding the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq (Weed, Pres. References 
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28). Within both of the President's September notifications to Congress, Obama again 
cited the WPR's reporting requirements and stated that such actions were pursuant to his 
constitutional authority and the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 28). While not 
explicitly citing the 2002 AUMF against Iraq within these notifications, the 
Administration continued to rely on the 2002 AUMF as a source of secondary-authority 
for the President to conduct anti-Islamic State operations in Iraq, despite previously 
advocating for its repeal (Ramsey 17-18). Despite being formed well after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, Obama relied on the 2001 AUMF as the proper authority 
to engage the Islamic State as an "associated force" of al-Qaeda in Iraq throughout his 
presidency (Brandon-Smith). 
 An assessment into Barack Obama's expansion of presidential war powers would 
not be complete without detailing his extensive use of remote drone warfare during his 
presidency. Beginning in 2000, the United States drone program was developed and 
refined by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan (Sifton). These early 
drone operations were conducted using unarmed drones for the purpose of intelligence 
gathering operations on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda (Sifton). Shortly following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the CIA began arming 
drones to seek and destroy Bin Laden and al-Qaeda associated targets through precision 
airstrikes (Sifton). Under the direction of Obama's predecessor George W. Bush, the 
United States expanded armed drone operations outside of Afghanistan and conducted 
fifty drone airstrikes against al-Qaeda "associated" persons and organizations in Pakistan, 
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Yemen and Somalia, killing an estimated 296 terrorists and 195 civilians in the process 
(Zenko, Obama's Embrace). 
 Upon assuming the presidency in 2009, Obama began to vastly expand W. Bush's 
use of drones for counterterrorism operations under the 2001 AUMF by ordering his first 
two strikes just three days following his inauguration (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data). 
Throughout his two terms in office, President Obama ordered approximately five-
hundred, and forty drone strikes principally in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, killing an 
"estimated 3,797 people, including 324 civilians" (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data). Just as 
he had done in Iraq with the Islamic State, many of Obama's drone strikes in Yemen and 
Somalia were authorized against "associated" groups or persons of al-Qaeda formed well 
after the enactment of the 2001 AUMF (Ramsey 13-14). For instance, many of Obama's 
drone strikes in Yemen were directed at al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
which formed in 2009 out of a union of prior al-Qaeda affiliates within the region 
(Ramsey 14). In Somalia, Obama namely targeted persons with ties to al-Qaeda within 
the militant group al-Shabab, which was formed in 2004 but pledged allegiance to al-
Qaeda in 2012 (Ramsey 14). 
 Aside from the massive destruction President Obama left in his wake, perhaps the 
most notable impact of his presidency regarding war powers were the efforts undertaken 
by his Administration to institutionalize and normalize the use of drone warfare (Zenko, 
Obama's Embrace). Indeed, the Obama Administration did not believe these strikes took 
place in the context of "war" and were therefore out of the reach of Congress. Unlike his 
predecessor, Obama took unprecedented action by acknowledging the use of covert drone 
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strikes in non-battlefield settings in 2011 (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). Shortly after, the 
Obama Administration began carefully scripting language and scrupulously crafting 
policy framework regarding the presidential usage of drones and lethal counterterrorism 
operations in "conventional war zones" and "areas outside active hostilities" (Tankel et 
al.). In the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), Obama codified the legal 
"Procedures for Approving Direct Action Outside the United States and Areas of Active 
Hostilities" (Tankel et al.). According to Obama's 2013 PPG, before conducting lethal 
operations in areas outside of active hostilities, the president would need to provide an 
operational plan including a counterterrorism objective and a given duration for the use 
of force, a legal basis for doing so and approval from a high-ranking White House official 
(Tankel et al.). Obama's PPG required strict conditions to be met, including a suspected 
imminent threat towards U.S. persons posed by the target and the consent of the host 
nation (Tankel et al.). If the host nation did not consent to the operation, the president 
would still be enabled to conduct the operation in the absence of other alternatives 
through "near certainty" that the approved target would be present, provided that civilians 
would not be harmed (Tankel et al.). Once an authorization was granted under the PPG, 
"signature strikes" against unidentified terrorist suspects could be conducted freely as 
well, so long as U.S. citizens were not involved (Tankel et al.). 
 In May of 2013, Obama announced to Congress and the American public that his 
Administration had formalized such reforms trough the PPG, but there is little evidence 
that supports this assertion (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). For instance, according to the 
Obama Administration, such reforms did not apply to drone operations in Pakistan post-
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PPG, "where roughly 40 percent of all non-battlefield drone strikes (…) 
occurred" (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). Additionally, while Obama left his policies 
regarding drone warfare in ill-effect during the latter half of his presidency, he received 
no meaningful opposition from Congress, who overwhelmingly supported the president's 
expropriation of their war powers through his actions (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data).  
While Congress did not meaningfully oppose the President's covert usage of drone 
strikes, sects of the American public and the international community began to pressure 
the Obama Administration to publicly acknowledge the lethal consequences of his drone 
strikes (McKelvey). Amid mounting pressure to publicly adhere to his policies on the 
release of drone strike data, President Obama signed an executive order in July of 2016, 
which mandated the Director of the CIA to release annual reports regarding the usage of 
drones in lethal operations, including the total number of civilians killed (National 
Archives and Records Administration). As a result of Obama's tenure, extensive usage of 
unilaterally-ordered drone strikes are now normalized and cemented within the war 
powers of the presidency and in the eyes of the American public, despite international 
opposition to the practice (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). 
 In addition to the drone strikes used by the Obama Administration, Obama also 
ordered vast amounts of remote tomahawk cruise-missile and airstrikes against not only 
the "associated forces" of al-Qaeda but also other terrorist and rebel organizations in 
Yemen and Libya throughout his time in office. In October of 2016, President Obama 
authorized the U.S. Navy to target positions held by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen 
with tomahawk cruise-missile strikes without congressional authorization (Ramsey 
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13-14). While the Houthi group had no connection to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, the 
group had previously attacked U.S. Navy vessels in the region (Ramsey 13-14). In the 
absence of congressional approval, Obama was nonetheless justified to exercise his 
constitutional authority in this case, as he was responding to an attack on U.S. forces 
(Ramsey 13-14). While he was within his constitutional authority to order unilateral 
military action in Yemen, such was not the case in his Libya campaign. Despite 
considerable pushback from Congress following his intervention into the Libyan Civil 
War under supposed U.N. authority in 2011, Obama continued to order U.S. military 
action in Libya throughout his presidency— chiefly against anti-U.N. groups and the 
Islamic State (Bergen et. al). In the summer of 2016, Obama declared an area of Libya to 
be an area of active hostilities under the 2013 PPG to continue direct strikes against 
Islamic State militants in the country (Tankel et al.). 
 When Donald J. Trump was inaugurated in January of 2017, he inherited not only 
an empowered presidency but also a massive United States-led global campaign against 
terror. Like Obama, Trump campaigned on a platform to reduce U.S. intervention in 
"endless" foreign wars and vowed to bring American troops home from the Middle East 
and Afghanistan (Dreazen). While he claimed to want to reduce U.S. intervention in 
foreign wars, Trump also campaigned on decimating terrorist organizations such as al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State in the global war on terror (Tankel et al.). As a candidate, 
Trump's strategy for destroying the Islamic State was to "bomb the shit out of 'em," and 
argued that the United States would also "have to take out their families" to wage 
successful counterterrorism operations (Tankel et al.). Since assuming the presidency, 
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Trump has expanded U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda, and it's "associated 
forces," as well as Islamic State (Tankel et al.). In doing so, Trump has relied on the 
Obama Administration's expansive interpretation of prior congressional authorizations to 
continue waging—and in some cases— expanding United States military operations in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Iraq. Aside from ongoing efforts, the 
Trump Administration expanded U.S. combat operations to Syria against the Islamic 
State and al-Assad forces, while threatening to unilaterally order military action towards 
North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.  
 The Trump Administration continues anti-Islamic State combat operations under 
the Obama Administration's interpretation of the 2001 AUMF. While Obama relied on the 
2002 AUMF as mostly an "alternative statutory basis" to the 2001 AUMF for 
counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, Trump has taken this 
interpretation further by asserting that the 2002 AUMF also addresses "threats to, or 
stemming from, Iraq" in "Syria or elsewhere" from IS operations (Brandon-Smith). 
Perhaps more controversially, however, in 2017, Trump unilaterally extended U.S. direct-
combat operations in Syria outside of the Islamic State threat and towards the regime of 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (Arkin et al.). In retaliation for a supposed chemical 
attack on Syrian civilians by al-Assad forces, President Trump ordered fifty-nine 
tomahawk cruise-missile strikes against various Syrian air defense and infrastructure 
targets on April 6, 2017 (Arkin et al.). Following the initial strike of al-Assad forces, in 
January of 2018, the Trump Administration announced that it would continue to fight 
against the Islamic State and al-Assad (which had received material support from the 
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Russian and Iranian governments) through an "open-ended military presence" in the 
Syrian Civil War (Borger et al.). In December 2018, however, Trump ordered the 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria and declared victory over IS forces in the 
country (Landler et al.). Nonetheless, on November 23, 2019, the head of the U.S. 
Central Command announced there would be no imminent "end date" of U.S. 
involvement in Syria (Seligman). According to the Trump Administration, a small U.S. 
military "contingency" force continues to remain in the country to prevent a resurgence of 
the Islamic State in Syria and to negate any advances by Iran or Russia in the region 
towards the interests of the United States (Seligman). 
 Using the broad interpretation of the 2001 AUMF catalyzed through previous 
administrations, the Trump Administration continues U.S. counterterrorism combat 
operations outside of Iraq and Syria in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya 
to the present day. The War in Afghanistan, now the longest running war in American 
history, continues to be raged under the authority of the 2001 AUMF. Trump has 
continued to build upon the air and drone strike campaigns of his predecessors against 
“associated forces” of al-Qaeda in Pakistan (Table 4), Libya (Bergen et. al), Yemen and 
Somalia (Table 5) under the authority supposedly granted by the 2001 AUMF. 
Additionally, the Trump Administration has been less transparent regarding the use of 
drones and the lethality of such. In March of 2019, President Trump revoked Obama’s 
2016 Executive Order which required the CIA Director to release annual summaries of 
U.S. drone strikes and related-casualties, as the Trump Administration considered it 
“superfluous” and distracting (McKelvey). As a result, the presidency is essentially once 
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again enabled to conduct lethal drone operations covertly, thus leaving the actual number 
of drone strikes and their results classified under the Trump Administration.  
 In addition to Trump’s revoke of Obama’s 2016 Executive Order on drone strike 
transparency, the Trump Administration has also taken additional action which has 
enabled an increase in drone strikes and troop deployments both inside and outside of 
traditional war zones. In late 2017, the Trump Administration replaced Obama’s PPG 
guidelines for conducting direct operations outside of traditional war zones with his own 
framework, known as “Principles, Standards, and Procedures” (PPS) (Tankel et al.). 
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Table 5: Total U.S. Air and Drone Strikes in Yemen and Somalia from George W. 
Bush through Donald J. Trump (as of March 30, 2020)
Administration Total Number of Drone of Air 
Strikes in  
Yemen
Total Number of Drone or Air 
Strikes in Somalia
George W. Bush 1 7
Barack Obama 182 43
Donald J. Trump 101 (Insufficient Detail) 176
Total 284 226
Source(s): Bergen, Peter, et al. “America's Counterterrorism Wars (Data on Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and 
Libya).” New America, New America, 30 Mar. 2020.
Table 4: Total U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan (June 19, 2004 through March 30, 
2020)
Administration Total Number of Drone Strikes in Pakistan
George W. Bush 48
Barack Obama 353
Donald J. Trump 13
Total 414
Source(s): Bergen, Peter, et al. “America's Counterterrorism Wars (Data on Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and 
Libya).” New America, New America, 30 Mar. 2020.
Under Trump’s PPS, the U.S. may now target suspected terrorists outside of traditional 
war zones even if they do not pose a “continuing, imminent threat” towards U.S. persons 
(Tankel et al.). While it is clear that such action increases the number of persons the U.S. 
may target, the Trump Administration has not yet provided information as to the current 
standard for counterterrorism military actions in non-traditional war zones (Tankel et al.). 
Additionally, while the approval of higher-ranking White House officials are still required 
to begin operations in a new country, proposed drone strikes no longer have to be 
subjected to the same scrutiny as the 2013 PPG (Tankel et al.). Instead, the Trump 
Administration has delegated the approval process to those of “lower levels of seniority” 
under the current policy guidelines (Tankel et al.). As a result of President Trump’s 
changes to the standards governing direct military action, the U.S. is now enabled to 
conduct more drone strikes and counterterrorism operations than under the previous 
administration. For instance, between 2016 and 2017, there was a notable increase in 
drone strikes against targets in Yemen and Somalia (Tankel et al.). While Trump has 
eased the standards for direct action outside of areas of active hostilities, he has also 
relaxed the rules of engagement within traditional war zones (Tankel et al.). Trump has 
also delegated the presidential authority of controlling the deployment of U.S. forces to 
the Pentagon (Tankel et al.). As a consequence of Trump’s actions, deployments of U.S. 
special operations forces have increased globally and operations have been conducted 
more aggressively as opposed to the previous (Tankel et al.).  
 While Trump has continued to expand military operations seemingly unopposed, 
there have been seldom instances of congressional pushback. In early 2019, Congress 
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passed S.J.Res.7 in an attempt to remove U.S. forces engaged in “hostilities” in Yemen 
(Anderson). The joint resolution, which was grounded in the requirements of the War 
Powers Resolution, directed “the President to remove [U.S. armed forces] from hostilities 
in or affecting the Republic of Yemen,” except those targeting al-Qaeda, within 30 days, 
“unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use . . . has been 
enacted” (Anderson). Further, the joint resolution defined “hostilities” in which U.S. 
forces were engaged in as “in-flight refueling of non-[U.S.] aircraft conducting missions 
as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen” (Anderson). Despite congressional efforts to 
remove U.S. forces from such “hostilities” in Yemen, President Trump informed 
Congress that he was vetoing the measure on April 16, 2019 (Anderson). Within his veto 
statement to Congress, Trump stated that such U.S. military operations in Yemen were 
crucial to defending “the safety of the more than 80,000 Americans who reside in certain 
coalition countries” whom have been subjected to attacks stemming from Yemen 
(Anderson). In accordance with presidential tradition, Trump also iterated that actions to 
“prohibit certain tactical operations, such as in-flight refueling, or require military 
engagements to adhere to arbitrary timelines” were “dangerous,” as they would “interfere 
with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces” (Anderson). Following Trump’s veto of S.J.Res.7, the United States has 
continued to conduct military operations in Yemen (Bergen et. al). 
 As Trump has expanded U.S. forces and combat operations against terror and into 
foreign wars in a manner reflective of previous administrations, he has asserted an 
unprecedented amount of unilateral authority to order military action against numerous 
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foreign nations. Through both “tweets” on the social media platform Twitter and 
traditional venues of presidential address, Trump has threatened to order unilateral U.S. 
military action against Venezuela, North Korea and Iran since assuming the presidency in 
2017. Here are 5 such examples: 
1. On August 11, 2017, President Trump threatened to unilaterally commit U.S. forces 
into hostilities in Venezuela against the socialist regime of president Nicholás 
Maduro, stating that “We [the Trump Administration] have many options for 
Venezuela including a possible military option if necessary,” as “Venezuela is not 
very far away and the people are suffering and dying” (Jacobs). 
2. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 2017, 
President Trump announced that if forced to defend itself, the “United States would 
totally destroy North Korea” in response (Hamedy). 
3. In January of 2018, amid reports of ongoing North Korean nuclear weapons testing 
and other intimidations towards the United States and U.S. allies in the region, the 
President tweeted:  
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his 
desk at all times.” Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime 
please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & 
more powerful one than his, and my Button works! (Beckwith) 
4. Following the U.S. strike in Baghdad, Iraq which killed Iranian General Qassem 
Soleimani on January 3, 2020, President Trump issued a warning against any Iranian 
retaliatory action in response on January 5, 2020. Within his warning, Trump also 
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asserted that his tweets serve as “notification” to Congress regarding the initiation of 
U.S. military action:  
These Media Posts will serve as notification to the United States Congress that 
should Iran strike any U.S. person or target, the United States will quickly & 
fully strike back, & perhaps in a disproportionate manner. Such legal notice is not 
required, but is given nevertheless! (Snow and Leo) 
As an indicator of the changing nature of politics and the larger debate regarding 
constitutional war powers, the House Foreign Affairs Committee replied to the 
President’s assertion of due “notification” to Congress the same day, by crafting a tweet 
of their own: “This Media Post will serve as a reminder that war powers reside in the 
Congress under the United States Constitution. And that you should read the War Powers 
Act [the War Powers Resolution]. And that you’re not a dictator.” (Snow and Leo). 
5. While tensions continued to escalate with Iran following the U.S. killing of Iranian 
General Qassem Soleimani, Trump further threatened Iran with military action on 
April 1, 2020, tweeting “Upon information and belief, Iran or its proxies are planning 
a sneak attack on U.S. troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a 
very heavy price, indeed!” (Jackson and Brook). 
Since assuming the office, Trump’s tweets regarding threats of military force are now 
treated as “official statements” from the White House and threats to unilaterally order 
U.S. military force abroad have been a reoccurring theme throughout Trump’s tenure 
(Beckwith). While these threats to use force are seemingly unprecedented, they are not 
solely a product of President Trump. Rather, these statements illustrate how far 
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presidential actions and assertions of presidential war powers have deviated from the 
actual institutional balance prescribed by the Founders in the Constitution.  
 As demonstrated throughout this section, Presidents George W. Bush, Barack 
Obama and Donald J. Trump continued to build upon the expansive assertions of 
presidential war powers as established and developed since 1942. During this period, 
Presidents either relied upon on broad interpretations of existing congressional 
authorizations, expansive assertions of constitutional authority, U.N. resolutions, or 
support from NATO allies to unilaterally force the Nation’s military forces into hostilities 
and conflict. As was the case from 1942-2001, during the twenty-first century Congress 
did not meaningfully challenge the presidential expropriation of their constitutionally-
granted war powers. Rather, Congress catalyzed the practice and the global war on terror, 
by enabling the president to assert dominating authority over the Nation’s war powers 
through previous precedent, the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and by failing to meaningfully 
oppose these actions through legal and political checks. 
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  On January 3, 2020, President Trump unilaterally ordered a drone strike, which 
killed Iranian major general Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport in 
Iraq (Helsel et al.). To justify the unilateral order, the Trump Administration has relied on 
the President's inherent Article II powers as commander in chief, the 2002 AUMF against 
Iraq, and as a "matter of national self-defense" under the United Nations Charter 
(Goodman and Vladeck, Setzler). Despite claims from the executive branch that the 
President took "decisive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad" meant to "stop a war," 
Trump's actions were not met with the same enamor in Congress (Helsel et al. and White 
House). Following Soleimani's demise, a bipartisan coalition in Congress sharply 
rebuked the President Trump's justification for his unilateral order against Iran grounded 
in the 2002 AUMF (Carney). These contrasting interpretations of Trump's drone strike 
spawned the scope of this study: When authoring the Constitution, what did the Founding 
Fathers intend the legislative and executive branches to do in the context of war, and how 
have these branches adhered to the Founders' original intent concerning war powers 
throughout American history? In this final development, we will consider President 
Trump's justification and congressional claims of unauthorized military action in light of 
the Founders' intentions and historical practice of the Nation's war powers. 
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Conclusion
Through their experiences under British rule, the Founders were well aware of how 
tyranny could extend from a unitary executive empowered with unilateral war-making 
capabilities. As such, when crafting the Constitution, the Founders instituted a system of 
checks and balances to ensure the Nation would not subject to war without congressional 
authorization. Within Article I, Section 8, the Founders vested numerous war powers to 
the legislative branch, including the power to declaring war, to raising and support 
armies, provide and maintain a navy and calling forth the militia to Congress. Once 
Congress did authorize military action, the Founders empowered the president with 
considerable latitude in executing such actions as commander in chief under his Article II 
authority. Except for repelling attacks against the United States, the Founders never 
intended the president to be enabled to act unilaterally by ordering military action in the 
absence of congressional authorization. 
 From 1789-1942, this institutional balance was—for the most part— adhered to 
by America's leadership. The presidential tradition of expropriating war powers from 
Congress was initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt and catapulted by Harry Truman 
through his interventionist doctrine against the spread of communism in the Cold War. 
Following Truman's unilateral deployment of U.S. forces into the Korean War under the 
supposed auspice of international authority, presidents have since claimed similar wide-
ranging assertions in war-making. Following decades of presidential expansionism, it 
took a vastly unpopular war in Vietnam, and in particular, Nixon's invasion of Cambodia 
in 1970, for Congress to attempt to reassert their constitutional war powers through the 
War Powers Resolution.  
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 While the War Powers Resolution intends to reestablish the institutional balance 
of the Nation's war powers as prescribed by the Founders, it has failed to do so for a 
variety of reasons. In comparison with the Constitution, the WPR grants the president far 
greater unilateral authority in war-making by allowing the president to deploy American 
military forces abroad without congressional authorization for up to ninety days. To 
check this ability, under the WPR Congress was initially permitted to end any U.S. 
military involvement abroad by a simple majority-vote by concurrent resolution. 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha however, Congress now requires a 
veto-proof majority to end presidential military action. Additionally, since its enactment 
in 1973, presidents have treated the WPR as an unconstitutional and a non-binding 
encroachment on their own constitutional authorities. When presidents have cited the War 
Powers Resolution in their reports to Congress regarding military action, they have done 
so as consistent with, rather than in pursuance of the WPR. From Nixon forward, 
presidents have either ignored the WPR or used it as a blank check to introduce U.S. 
forces abroad for up to ninety days without congressional approval. Additionally, in the 
past, three presidents have narrowed the definition of military action, which requires 
congressional authorization. For instance, when Obama unilaterally committed U.S. 
forces into the Libyan Civil War in 2011, his administration argued that such actions did 
not constitute war or hostilities under the WPR and thus were permitted through the 
president's constitutional authorities without congressional authorization. 
 Simultaneously, Congress has permitted the expansion of presidential war-making 
by allowing presidents to interpret existing and outdated authorizations of military force 
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broadly. Unlike the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which thrust the United States into the 
Vietnam War, Congress has failed to repeal various authorizations to use military force 
which has enabled the presidency to continuously entrench and expand U.S. forces 
abroad in endless foreign military contests. While the 2001 AUMF was intended to be 
tailored toward authorizing military force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban—the 
perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the United States— it has 
been used by the presidency as a broad justification to use force against actors which did 
not even exist at the time, such as I.S. and AQAP. Since its enactment in 2001, the AUMF 
against terror has been cited as a statutory basis for U.S. military operations in "at least 
19 different countries, including seven of which that are ongoing" (Kosar). Perhaps the 
most notable ongoing operation under 2001 AUMF authority, the War in Afghanistan, is 
now the longest-running war in American history and continues to be raged with 
inconclusive results at the expense of American life and resources. Meanwhile, the 2002 
AUMF against Iraq continues to be cited as a justification for the presidency to order 
further military action in Iraq and Syria, despite it being tailored to fight against Saddam 
Hussein's Iraqi regime in 2002. As U.S. and coalition forces toppled Hussein's 
government in 2003, just as the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF has long outlived its 
enacted purpose.  
 By using the 2002 AUMF to justify military action against Iran, the Trump 
Administration has underscored this notion. As the title of the AUMF makes clear, the 
authorization of military force is "against Iraq," not Iran (Goodman and Vladeck). Within 
its stated purpose, the 2002 AUMF authorizes the president to use military force in order 
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to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed 
by Iraq," and to enforce relevant U.N. resolutions "regarding Iraq" (Goodman and 
Vladeck). As such, in ordering the attack that killed Soleimani, the Trump Administration 
is not relying on relevant statutory authority, national self-defense under the United 
Nations, or the Constitution. Instead, the Trump Administration is relying on the broad 
war powers assertions of the modern presidency, enabled through appeasement, and a 
lack of meaningful opposition from Congress. Trump, like his processors, knows that 
Congress is unlikely to mount a unified effort, which would hamper his ability to wield 
the Nation's military forces unilaterally.  
 As it stands, the modern president asserts his dominance over war powers in a 
manner more reflective of the British monarch versus that of the Founders' intentions. 
Fortunately, there is a solution— the Constitution. In order for the Nation's war powers to 
be returned to its original balance, Congress must take a meaningful and unified stance to 
reassert its rightful powers over war using its constitutional checks on the executive 
branch. If not, the presidency is likely to continue its present tradition of asserting a 
unilateral dominance over the Nation's military and further thrust the United States into 
perpetual conflict abroad. 
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